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Announcing the Fifth Biennial 
Lilly Fellows lrogram 
Book Award 
The Lilly Fellows Prozram in Humanities and the Arts invites nominations 
for the Lilly Fellows Prozram Book Award. 
The biennial Lilly Fellows Program Book Award honors an original and imaginative work from 
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to the past, present, and future of higher education. 
Single authored books or edited collections in any discipline, published in 2009 to 2012, are 
eligible. 
A Prize of $3000 will be awarded at the Lilly Fellows Program national Conference at the 
University of Scranton, October 18-20, 2013. 
The committee will receive nominations of academic faculty, clergy, and olhers. Authors or 
editors cannot nominate their own works. 
Nomination deadline is March 1, 2013 
For nomination procedures and further information, please visit: 
http:/ /www.lillyfellows.org/ GrantsPrizes/ 2011 LFPBookAward.aspx 
The Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts 
The Lill y Fellows Program in Humanities and the Arts, established in 1991 , seeks to strengthen the quality and shape rhe 
character of church-related institutions of higher. 
First, it offers graduate and residential posrdocroml reaching fellowships for young scholars who ·wish tO renew their sense of 
vocation within a Christian community of learning in order to prepare themselves for positions of educational leadership 
within church-related institutions. 
Second, ir maintains a collaborative National Network of Church-Related Colleges and Universities that sponsors a variety of 
activities and publications designed ro explore the Christian character of the academic vocation and ro strengthen the religious 
nature of church-related institutions. The National Network represents a diversjry of denominational traditions, institutional 
types, and geographical locations. 
The Lilly Fellows Program in Human ities and the Arrs is based in Christ College, 
the interdisciplinary honors college of Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana. 
For more information, please consult the LUly Fellows Program website at 
www.lillyfellows.org 
INLucE TuA 
In Thy Light 
An Advent Fast 
A
NOTHER ELECTION IS BEHIND US. '~ND 
there was much rejoicing:' American 
election campaigns have evolved into 
marathons that test the endurance of both candi-
dates and voters. If not everyone is happy with the 
outcome, everyone at least is happy when they are 
over. The candidates spend months on the road 
giving speeches, working the crowds, and raising 
money. We as voters only have to watch, listen, and 
make up our minds. That ought to be easy enough, 
but we still find the process a burden. In my expe-
rience, this campaign was no worse than others. 
Of course, it had its share of negativity, mendacity, 
and absurdity, but when people complain about 
our ugly elections, I remember political scientist 
Samuel Popkin's observation: if American politics 
are vulgar it is because Americans are vulgar. Our 
politicians are no fools. We might tell them that 
we want a modern-day version of the Lincoln-
Douglas debates, but they know that we would 
not watch the Lincoln-Douglas debates even if 
they came in an iPhone app. They also know what 
actually makes us pay attention, what gets us 
excited, and what kinds of things we remember. 
Campaigns are crass, ugly, and loud, because we 
respond to them when they are that way. 
But now the campaigns are finally silent, 
and just in time, because the Christmas noise is 
well underway. A few radio stations start play-
ing Christmas music as early as November 1, but 
our holiday observances really get started every 
year when Americans finish giving thanks for all 
the blessings in their lives just in time to rush off 
and go shopping. Almost no one is happy that 
the Christmas season gets started so early. This 
year, stores like Target and Wal-Mart were widely 
criticized for launching their Black Friday sales 
on Thanksgiving Thursday, but the stores were 
as full as ever and labor union protests against 
retailers had little impact. I am tempted to para-
phrase Popkin: if Christmas is vulgar, it is because 
Christians are vulgar. If Christmas is not what it 
should be, maybe we should stop blaming capital-
ists, or the "War on Christmas;' or whomever. If 
there is something wrong with Christmas, per-
haps the fault is our own. 
The time of year called "the Christmas season" 
is also known as Advent. Advent was once a time 
of repentance and fasting, a season of preparation 
during which we simplified our lives and awaited 
the coming of the Lord. It has since become a 
time of excess and consumption. We overeat, 
overspend, and generally overdo it. But if we no 
longer fast from food, there are other fasts we 
might undertake. In "Thinking about Thinking;' 
Harold K. Bush proposes a digital fast. For a cou-
ple of days each week, shut the computer off and 
leave the smartphone behind. Give your brain a 
rest from electronic stimulation. And after read-
ing Jennifer Forness's reflections on the absence of 
silence in contemporary music ("Turn That Stuff 
Down"), I have decided that this Advent I need a 
noise fast. Noise, like many other kinds of physical 
stimulation, is addictive. We surround ourselves 
with artificial noise: music constantly in the back-
ground, television news and sports that we mostly 
ignore anyway, and the constant beeping and 
buzzing of various gadgets. 
If we can turn down the noise, we might be 
able to hear something much more important. 
Without all the artificial noise, we will be better 
able to hear the real sounds created by people and 
places near and dear to us. As Josef Pieper wrote in 
Leisure: Ihe Basis of Culture, "only the silent hear 
and those who do not remain silent do not hear:' 
When we are silent, we can experience the world 
and God's presence in it. So many things come and 
go noisily, hurling themselves at our senses and 
disappearing as soon as the next one pushes them 
aside. But at the Nativity, God the Eternal comes 
into our world as God the Incarnate and comes to 
us as a child born in the silence of night. During 
Advent, we wait and listen for this God. 1 
-]PO 
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The Scientist's Finger 
Thomas Cathcart 
PAUL TILLICH USED TO TELL HIS CLASSES about a scientist at Harvard who approached him to say he would not be 
attending Tillich's public lecture that evening 
because he knew it would be irrational. Tillich 
invited him to "please come, sit in the front row, 
and anytime I say something you think is irratio-
nal, raise your finger, so I will know:' "No;' said 
the scientist, "I would have my finger raised the 
whole time:' 
And then Tillich would laugh. We thought he 
was probably laughing at the absurdity of what the 
scientist said. But it occurs to me now that perhaps 
he was laughing instead at a sort of cosmic joke. 
Perhaps what struck him funny is that the scientist 
had pinpointed the nature of the dialogue, or lack 
thereof, between people of faith and people out-
side the community of faith. 
Tillich famously wrote that theology occurs 
only within the circle of faith, that it is by, and 
principally for, those who are already grasped by 
faith. Looked at from outside the circle of faith, 
theological statements are in a sense irrational. 
In Christian terms, if you are not grasped by the 
power ofJesus as the Christ, no amount of theolo-
gizing will convert you. 
Karl Barth thought this meant that theology 
has little to say to those outside the circle, but 
Tillich was unwilling to go that far. He thought 
that clarifying the questions of human existence 
and showing how they correspond to assertions 
of faith can sometimes open up a space in which 
genuine dialogue between the church and the 
world becomes possible, a dialogue that can some-
times even remove a barrier to faith. 
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People Have Faith in God Because They Want To 
We will take a look at an extreme instance, a 
statement that looks totally different from inside 
and outside the circle of faith and see if elucida-
tion can create the possibility of dialogue: 
"People have faith in God because they 
want to:' 
Who was the author of this statement? Was it 
Freud, who thought religions are wish-fulfilling 
illusions? Or perhaps Marx, who called religion 
the opiate of the masses? Or was it Nietzsche, who 
thought Christianity springs from resentment 
of the strong by the weak? Or perhaps Richard 
Dawkins, the contemporary biologist, who called 
one of his books The God Delusion? 
Actually, these words-"People have faith 
in God because they want to" -were spoken by 
Dorothy Day, co-founder of the Catholic Worker 
movement. 
"People have faith in God because they want 
to?" What could she have meant? Was she capitu-
lating to the taunts of the agnostics and atheists 
of her day? Was she unaware of the seeming 
irrationality of what she said? If we were "new 
atheists;' we would certainly pounce on her state-
ment as evidence of the wish-fulfilling character 
of religious faith. What could make it clearer that 
religion is an irrational attempt to fashion a God 
from our own desires? 
As it happens, we don't know exactly what 
Dorothy Day had in mind, but the notion that 
people have faith in God because they want to 
just may contain the secret of religious faith. It 
is a secret that the faithful tacitly understand, 
although often through a glass darkly. It is also a 
secret that, even when revealed, has been unper-
suasive to millions of people throughout history 
and perhaps to most people in the northern hemi-
sphere in our day. Indeed, how one reacts to this 
secret may indicate whether one is inside or out-
side the circle of faith. 
Much has been written recently about the 
difference between faith and belief; Harvey Cox, 
for example, has written an entire book about that 
difference (The Future of Faith, 2009). In both the 
Bible and much of Christian history, we find that 
faith is not synonymous with "belief;' at least not 
in the metaphysical sense that one believes or 
does not believe in Santa Claus or the tooth fairy. 
Rather, faith is synonymous with "trust:' Faith in 
God means trust in God. 
In English, we do sometimes use the word 
"faith" to mean belief, but we also use the word in 
several other ways. If I say, "I have faith in myself;' 
I do not, of course, mean that I believe that I exist; 
I mean that I have a basic trust, or confidence, in 
myself. When, as a Red Sox fan, I tried to "keep 
the faith" during the eighty-six years without a 
World Series victory, I was not trying to believe 
that a team called the Red Sox exists-although 
there were years when one had to wonder. What I 
really meant was that I should not give up the trust 
that next year or the year after might be The Year. 
We will leave aside temporarily the obvious 
issue of whether "trust in God" necessarily implies 
a metaphysical belief in the existence of an entity 
called "God" -that is to say, the Santa Claus ques-
tion. It is, of course, a question on which religious 
thought has often foundered. Before we can exam-
ine that question, however, it is important to know 
exactly what we mean by faith or trust in God. 
The way the synoptic gospels and Acts pose 
the issue of faith is: do you trust in the "good 
news"? Mark's gospel, for example, has Jesus begin 
his ministry by announcing, "The time is fulfilled, 
and the kingdom of God has come near; repent, 
and believe in [pisteuete, trust in] the good news" 
(Mark 1:15, NRSV). The early Christians went so 
far as to name some of their most important texts 
"good newses:' So what is this good news? Why is 
it news, and why is it good? And the most difficult 
question: what does it mean to trust in it? 
The answers to these questions, of course, fill 
entire libraries, but the basic answer to what the 
good news is, is really rather simple. The good 
news is that we are accepted into the Kingdom of 
God. That's it. We are accepted. 
Why is this news? It is news because deep 
down people of faith know they are unacceptable. 
We have now entered very dangerous waters. 
Sin has gotten a bad name, so to speak, in the last 
Faith is not synonymous with 
"belief;' at least not in the 
metaphysical sense that one believes 
or does not believe in Santa Claus 
or the tooth fairy. Rather, faith is 
synonymous with "trust:' 
century, replaced by psychological "issues:' What 
do you mean, you're unacceptable? Isn't that neu-
rotic? Morbid? A delusion of grandeur? As if your 
pathetic peccadilloes amount to anything as grand 
as unacceptability! Unacceptable to whom? To 
yourself? Then deal with it. To your parents? See 
a psychotherapist. Isn't this feeling of being unac-
ceptable just a manifestation of what Nietzsche 
saw as the self-loathing of the weak? Real men 
don't feel unacceptable. 
These are all legitimate questions and criti-
cisms, and, unfortunately, they often point to a 
sad truth. Millions of people do harbor neurotic, 
morbid, self-loathing experiences of unworthi-
ness, and hundreds of thousands of psychiatrists, 
psychologists, and other mental health workers 
have emerged to try to help these people sort out 
the unconscious or interpersonal sources of these 
feelings. 
People of faith, however, feel that there is 
also a non-neurotic sense in which they are 
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unacceptable. It stems from our human ability 
to see ourselves and our lives, as Spinoza put it, 
sub specie aeternitatis: that is, "from the point of 
view of eternity:' Whenever we ask, "What does 
my life add up to anyway?" we are speaking sub 
specie aeternitatis. (How else could a life "add up" 
to anything except when seen as a whole and, 
metaphorically speaking, "from above"?) When 
we ask ourselves whether we are living up to our 
ideals, we are speaking sub specie aeternitatis. 
(Ideals reside, after all, in "Plato's heaven;' beyond 
space and time.) When we feel guilty, we may be 
exhibiting neurosis, but we may also be speak-
ing sub specie aeternitatis. We may be feeling that 
we are not the persons we were somehow "meant 
to be" (Aristotle) or that we are not our ideal 
selves (Plato) or that we are "fallen" (Judaism and 
Christianity). 
Tillich's scientist might object that stating our 
feeling of unacceptability in this way-as stem-
ming from seeing ourselves from the standpoint 
of eternity-is to already be speaking the lan-
guage of faith, and that is correct. To someone 
who professes not to know what "the standpoint 
of eternity" could possibly mean or who thinks 
that it is an illusion, or to someone who thinks 
the question, "What does my life add up to?" is 
meaningless or a result of linguistic confusion, 
or to someone who simply doesn't care, there is 
no answer. Answers of faith can only be given to 
questions of faith. In other words, this is one junc-
ture at which some people will opt out of the circle 
of faith. As we will see, there are many other such 
junctures. But our question is: Is it less rational to 
think that looking at one's life sub specie aeternita-
tis is legitimate than to think that it is not? It is the 
question of the scientist's finger, and it is a ques-
tion that each person must answer for himself. 
What can be said about people who do 
experience the question of their own worth as a 
legitimate question? In particular, what can be 
said about the subset of those people who, upon 
examining themselves, find themselves unaccept-
able? First of all, what do they mean? And why do 
they not consider their experience of unworthi-
ness a neurotic symptom? 
Some people feel unworthy because they have 
deviated from some societal norm, but the more 
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interesting case for our purpose is people who may 
or may not have deviated from social norms but 
who know they are, in some way, untrustworthy. 
They may have actually broken a trust. They may 
have betrayed a person who placed her trust in 
them. They may have placed their own interest 
before that of their own children and witnessed a 
sad or even tragic outcome as their children devel-
oped or didn't. They may feel they are in someone 
else's debt, perhaps even that they owe another 
person a debt that can never be repaid, because 
the harm has been done and can never be undone. 
No matter how much remorse they have, they 
know the toothpaste can never be put back in the 
tube. They may have fallen into a cycle of addic-
tion that makes them a stranger to themselves and 
those who loved and trusted them. They may have 
been tested and responded in a cowardly way. If 
they have not actually violated a trust, they may 
know nonetheless that under the right circum-
stances they would. This is the experience that 
Kierkegaard called being pursued by the hound of 
heaven. It is to take what Alcoholics Anonymous 
calls "a searching and fearless moral inventory of 
ourselves" and to face the fact that we are not wor-
thy of our own trust. We have not kept faith with 
our own potential. We are not the god we hoped to 
be-or perhaps assumed we were. 
Therapy will not help such people. They do 
not want their self-insight to be medicated or, 
indeed, to be "cured" of it. In fact, they despise 
the fact that they often allow themselves to fall 
asleep to the ways in which they fall short of their 
own ego ideal. They feel compelled to affirm, with 
Kierkegaard, that "this is required of everyone, 
that before God [that is, sub specie aeternitatis], 
he shall candidly humble himself in view of the 
requirements of ideality" (Kierkegaard 1972: 71). 
This is a juncture at which many more peo-
ple opt out of the circle of faith. They may be 
people who do not take self-inventories for what-
ever reason, perhaps because they consider such 
assessments neurotic. They may be people who 
can honestly say that they never suffered from 
the delusion that they are a god. They may be 
people who can honestly say they find no cow-
ardice in themselves. They may be people who 
make occasional or frequent self-assessments, 
but find themselves basically acceptable: "no 
worse than anyone else" or "on balance, good and 
decent people" or "understandably inconsistent, 
given human nature:' People of faith should not 
be quick to judge these people. It may be tempt-
ing to think the non-guilty have simply not heard 
the bad news yet, but the safer course is to simply 
say, as Jesus did, "Those who have ears to hear, let 
them hear;' and "Those who are well have no need 
of a physician:' Again, Alcoholics Anonymous is 
helpful: don't take someone else's inventory. 
It is enough that the person of faith take his 
or her own inventory. And when he does, he is 
troubled. To use the ancient metaphor, he feels 
that he is "stained" in some way. He feels that there 
are parts of himself that he would not want to see 
the light of day, characteristics of himself that he 
would not put in his memoir, shadow qualities that 
he tries his best to hide in his everyday presenta-
tion of self, parts that he tries to hide even from 
himself. He acknowledges that he has hurt other 
people, perhaps irreparably, by putting his own 
interests before what he knows is good and right. 
He is aware that those closest to him know that in 
many ways he is a coward and a fraud. Perhaps he 
can make amends for some of his behavior, but he 
has to admit that he would not blame the people he 
has harmed if they were unable fully to trust him 
again. He is not even sure he fully trusts himself. 
Is such a self-assessment irrational? Is it neu-
rotic? Again, each person must decide for himself. 
The next step for the person of faith, however, 
is irrational. It is at this point that Tillich's scientist 
should raise his finger. What the person pursued 
by the hound of heaven is in need of is forgiveness. 
Only forgiveness-the wiping clean of his slate-
can help the person with a troubled conscience. 
And forgiveness is at its core irrational. 
What is rational is "an eye for an eye and a 
tooth for a tooth:' What is rational is that the 
righteous brother of the prodigal son should be 
rewarded, not the prodigal! What is rational is that 
the laborers in the vineyard who started work at 
dawn should be paid more than those who came 
at the eleventh hour. That is what makes sense. 
Forgiveness does not make sense. It isn't fair. 
What makes the good news good? Nothing, 
if you are the righteous brother. It is the worst 
news possible. If you are the brother who played 
by the rules all his life, who always did the accept-
able thing, who maintained all his relationships 
responsibly even when the going got tough, it is 
understandably infuriating that the brother who 
trashed his relationships and wasted his life in 
debauchery gets the feast. And yet the person of 
faith experiences that he is forgiven and accepted, 
that all his debts have been cancelled. When he 
expresses this in the language of religious sym-
holism, he says, "God is like the father in the 
What the person pursued by the 
hound of heaven is in need of is 
forgiveness. Only forgiveness-
the wiping clean of his slate-can 
help the person with a troubled 
conscience. And forgiveness 
is at its core irrational. 
parable. God forgives and accepts me, not because 
I deserve it or because I am basically okay, but 
because he loves me beyond reason, as a father 
or mother loves a child:' As Tillich put it, we find 
ourselves accepted, not because we are acceptable, 
but in spite of our being unacceptable. 
This is irrational, not just because we have 
now introduced the idea of God and raised the 
Santa Claus question, but more fundamentally 
because forgiveness is itself irrational. It would 
be irrational for a person convicted of a crime 
to expect that he will be immediately set free,. It 
would be irrational for a borrower to expect the 
lender to simply write off her debt. Both law and 
ethics rest on the idea of moral consequences for 
our actions. Forgiveness is an apparent acte gra-
tuit, a gratuitous, off-the-wall event, not subject to 
any rational rule. 
But what if forgiveness were seen, not merely 
as a judgment on the past, but as a creator of the 
future? As it happens, that is faith's view of the fact 
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of forgiveness. It is not that the prodigal son cleans 
up his act and is therefore forgiven. It is the other 
way around. It is only possible for a prodigal son to 
clean up his act because he finds himself forgiven-
or, as in the story, because he has faith that he will 
be. Otherwise, he could never have gone home. 
Forgiveness does not merely judge the old 
situation; it creates a new situation. The New 
Testament is full of metaphors for this phenom-
enon of faith. John has Jesus say that we can be 
born again. Paul says that we are a new creation, 
that we die to our old selves and are resurrected 
as a new self. But isn't it irrational-indeed, delu-
The mark of genuine forgiveness 
is that we forgive. Forgive us our 
debts as we forgive our debtors. 
sional-to trust that the utterly new can happen, 
that a new future can be handed to us? Well, per-
haps it would be-if it hadn't happened to us. 
But what about our acceptance of being 
accepted? Isn't that necessarily suspect? Are we 
simply letting ourselves off the hook, deluding 
ourselves that we have "been accepted" so that 
we can rid ourselves of our burden of guilt? This 
is another juncture at which people may under-
standably opt out of the circle of faith. They may 
judge that those who "experience forgiveness" are 
really only excusing themselves and covering up 
the self-serving nature of their bogus act of faith, 
hiding it from themselves to lend legitimacy to 
the experience. This is a sincere and damning 
objection, and the person of faith must wrestle 
constantly with it. 
The New Testament's answer is that it is the 
future that will tell the tale. The unmerciful ser-
vant in the parable has his debt cancelled by his 
master, only to grab his own debtor by the throat 
and demand repayment. The mark of whether 
we have truly experienced the magnitude of our 
being accepted is how we behave toward those in 
debt to us. The mark of genuine forgiveness is that 
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we forgive. Forgive us our debts as we forgive our 
debtors. 
Perhaps, though, it is fraudulent to accept 
acceptance even if it does eventuate in our being 
merciful to others. How dare we attribute our own 
excusing of ourselves to having received divine 
pardon? 
Because faith is a sort of confidence, an analy-
sis of the logic of confidence may shed some light 
on the phenomenon of religious faith. Many ado-
lescents struggle with issues of self-confidence. 
It is easy to see why this is so. It is impossible to 
perform well without confidence, but it seems 
impossible to have confidence without fore-
knowledge that you will perform well. Without 
confidence, adolescents spiral downward, becom-
ing more awkward and consequently even less 
confident. With confidence, adolescents spiral 
upward, becoming less awkward and consequently 
even more confident. What determines which way 
an adolescent develops is an acte gratuit, some-
thing external that breaks the cycle, breaks into 
the cycle, and determines its direction. Perhaps 
it is the blind love of a parent or the interest of 
a teacher. Perhaps it is dumb luck: the adolescent 
succeeds at something "in spite of himself" and 
is thereby launched in an upward spiral of confi-
dence and success. Or perhaps she has had early 
successes based on her particular set of inherited 
or developed skills, and it never occurs to her that 
her competence in any other sphere is a terrify-
ingly open question. In any case, the determining 
factor is always something external to the cycle 
of confidence. The adolescent is given the where-
withal to break the cycle. Through no merit of 
her own, she is handed a get-out-of-jail-free card. 
Here Tillich's scientist can raise his finger again. 
Confidence-trust, faith-in ourselves is always 
in the end dependent on something that cannot 
be rationally derived from the situation itself. No 
amount of saying "Be confident!" to oneself can 
produce confidence. It is a gift. 
The same is true of the faith to accept accep-
tance. Such faith is not a judgment based on a 
single experience of feeling accepted. People 
"grow in faith:' When you experience yourself 
as forgiven, you may find you are no longer an 
unmerciful servant. On the contrary, you may 
find yourself freed to be merciful to others. In this 
way, you participate in creating a new situation, 
for yourself and for someone else. This freedom 
in turn strengthens your trust in the fact that you 
have inexplicably been given a gift, a clean slate, 
cleared of the smudge of your own past. 
This scenario is obviously fraught with the 
possibility of doubt. The chief question is why 
you would deserve this gift. The answer is that 
you do not. Then why should you allow yourself 
to accept such a gift? Because you want to. Is this 
a wish-fulfilling fantasy? Or is it that you want to 
so badly that you are willing to pay the ultimate 
price, which is letting go of your own wishes, giv-
ing up all effort to justify yourself, all effort to 
think well of yourself, all pride? Perhaps you want 
to because thriving, flourishing, growing, creating 
feel to you to be at the heart of human existence, 
and if accepting the gift of acceptance allows you 
to flourish and to participate in creating a new self 
and new relationships and a new world, you feel 
there is nothing to be said but thank you. 
The Santa Claus Question 
Thank you to whom? Acceptance by whom? Is 
it not demanded of people of faith that they believe 
in the existence of some supernatural being who, 
among other things, accepts them? This is the 
question that in recent centuries has produced 
more rhetoric than any other religious question, 
most of it rather silly. 
The first thing to be said is that all religious 
language is, as Tillich says, symbolic. Do we really 
at this late date need to say that when we speak of 
God as creator, we are not positing an alternative 
to the Big Bang? That when we speak of human 
beings having been created in the image of God, 
we are not proposing an alternative to evolution? 
These questions were sorted out in principle in the 
eighteenth century (although of course neither the 
Big Bang nor the theory of evolution had yet been 
proposed). 
The Enlightenment skeptics are often said to 
have won these arguments, and that is certainly 
true; but the deeper truth is that, when the skep-
tics won, humanity won. When we take religious 
symbols literally, we do an injustice not only to 
reason, but also to faith. The doctrine of biblical 
inerrancy is not only irrational; it is blasphemous. 
The reason these literalistic questions persist 
three hundred years after the Enlightenment is 
that people of faith have not done a very good job 
of answering a key question: if religious language 
is not to be taken literally, how is it to be taken? 
What sort of validity could it possibly have? How 
does it differ from fantasy? 
It is tempting to think that perhaps people of 
faith should simply stop at the point at which we 
have arrived. Perhaps it is enough to speak only of 
our own existential experience of being accepted 
without adopting any particular religious symbols 
of the source of our acceptance. There are several 
religious traditions that take this tack, from the 
Theravada Buddhist experience of the Void to the 
Hindu practice of neti neti (not this, not this) to 
the Western medieval "way of negation;' the via 
negativa. The problem, as Tillich says, is that this 
is not a space in which most of us can live. Most of 
us are like the man in the parable who was cleansed 
of an unclean spirit; when it found his soul swept 
clean, it brought along seven other unclean spir-
its and moved back in. To put it another way: for 
most of us, the alternative to calling the source of 
our new life "Thou" is to call it "me:' But putting 
myself in the place of God is the very worldview 
that brought on my self-alienation, my experience 
of being unacceptable, in the first place. "Thou" 
expresses the experienced radical otherness of the 
source of our acceptance. "It is a fearful thing to 
fall into the hands of the living God:' "Thou" also 
expresses the living relationship the person of faith 
feels to the source of his new life. 
Who is this Thou? We can only answer sym-
bolically. "He" is like a father whose prodigal son 
has returned to him. "He" is like a vineyard owner 
who chooses to pay the workers who arrived late 
in the day the same amount as those who worked 
all day. "He" is like a shepherd who leaves the 
ninety-nine sheep to find the lost one. "He" is like 
a master who distributes money in the expecta-
tion that it will not be put in the ground but will 
be put to use in order to make it grow. "He" is like 
a lender who especially loves the debtor for whom 
he forgave the greater debt. "She" is like a hen that 
gathers her brood under her wings. 
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That is all very well, says our scientist, but 
does he or she exist? In a word, no. 
Entities exist. God is not an entity, not a 
"being alongside other beings" (Tillich). At this 
juncture people of faith struggle for language. God 
is being-itself or the ground of being (Aquinas). 
God is the power of being (Tillich). In biblical lan-
guage, God is the Creator of all being. In a sense, 
all such language is irrational. That is, it resides at 
the boundary of rational discourse. 
Heidegger's question, "Why are there beings 
rather than nothing?" does not mean, "What is 
the cause in the chain of causation that produces 
being?" It means, "What is it about this power of 
being that distinguishes it from nothing; what is it 
that 'overcomes' nothingness?" At the organic level, 
what is the elan vital that (fleetingly) favors life over 
death? What is the mysterious power to heal and 
to grow? At the level of our libido, as well as our 
intellectual and spiritual striving, what is this irre-
sistible desire that drives us beyond stasis? At the 
level of our relationships with other persons, what 
is the drive that makes us want to deepen them? At 
the noetic level, what is it about the strange power 
of consciousness that allows it to be conscious of 
itself? At the spiritual level, what is the power that 
makes it possible for us to accept transformation 
and go on despite our anxiety and despair? To the 
religious imagination, these manifestations of the 
power of being are all aspects of one power; call it 
the power of self-transcendence at every level of the 
chain of being. Is this irrational? Well, it is certainly 
non-rational. Rational argument can never demon-
strate that we should relate to the self-transcendent 
power of being in a personal or spiritual way. That 
is a personal decision. Are there rational criteria for 
making that decision? No. We either experience it 
as a gift or we do not. 
In the past, people stood more firmly within 
a historical tradition in which their forebears had 
12 The Cresset 
defined themselves by the particularities of their 
relationship to the power of being. Now for the 
first time in human history, multiple historical 
traditions, sacred and secular, have become acces-
sible to us. We cannot escape the frightening task 
of taking a personal stand. Kierkegaard called it 
by a very different word; he called it a leap, the 
leap of faith. In a sense, the reason we leap in one 
direction rather than any of the myriad others is 
"because we want to:' And the reason we want to 
is that we have received a gift. 
Our scientist is perhaps right after all to keep 
his finger in the air the whole time. ~ 
Thomas Cathcart studied with Paul Tillich 
as both an undergraduate and a graduate 
student in the 1960s. He is co-author, with 
Daniel Klein, of the New York Times best-
seller, Plato and a Platypus Walk into a Bar: 
Understanding Philosophy through Jokes, as 
well as Heidegger and a Hippo Walk through 
Those Pearly Gates: Using Philosophy (and 
Jokes!) to Explore Life, Death, the Afterlife, 
and Everything In Between. 
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Arrested Development 
The Films of Kenneth Lonergan 
Fredrick Barton 
BY THE TIME HE WAS THIRTY- EIGHT YEARS old in 2000, Kenneth Lonergan was already an established playwright with enough 
New York productions and award nominations on 
his resume to constitute a distinguished career for 
a man two decades his senior. He had also already 
dipped his toe into the more financially lucrative 
world of Hollywood by selling his spec script for 
the mob comedy Analyze This (1999) that even-
tually starred Billy Crystal and Robert De Niro. 
Then Lonergan wrote and directed You Can Count 
on Me (2000), a film that was both a commercial 
success and a critical smash. You Can Count on Me 
won the Grand Jury Prize at Sundance, along with 
a score of other awards and landed Oscar nomi-
nations for star Laura Linney and for Lonergan's 
screenplay. Those of us who love movies in gen-
eral, and You Can Count on Me in particular, 
couldn't wait to see what Lonergan did next. Two 
years later, he landed another screenwriting Oscar 
nomination for Martin Scorsese's Gangs of New 
York (2002), and he returned to the New York 
stage with so much success that he was hailed in 
certain quarters as the nation's most important 
playwright of the last two decades. 
But where was that next movie, not for hire, 
but for himself? Where was the follow up to You 
Can Count on Me? The answer: in Hollywood 
hell. Shortly after finishing his work on Gangs 
of New York, Lonergan undertook the writing of 
the film that would be released a long time later 
as Margaret (20ll). His reputation was such that 
he attracted A-list filmmakers Sydney Pollack and 
Scott Rudin as his producers and was granted the 
special privilege of authority over the "final cut;' 
as long as he delivered an edited film of no longer 
than 150 minutes. That length restriction even-
tually became a stumbling block of Himalayan 
proportions. 
Lonergan worked on the Margaret script for 
two years, revisiting many of the themes he had 
first raised in You Can Count on Me. But when he 
began shooting in the summer of 2005, he had a 
screenplay for a three-hour film that he hoped he 
could reduce to the required 150 minutes in the 
editing suite. This proved to be a horrible miscal-
culation. Despite two years of post-production 
efforts, Lonergan just wasn't able to cut the mate-
rial to contracted length. The result was several 
lawsuits by investors that further held up the film's 
release. Lonergan ended up having to borrow sev-
eral hundred thousand dollars from his friend 
and collaborator Matthew Broderick. His mentor, 
Scorsese, was eventually brought in to produce 
a 160-minute cut, an undertaking of loyalty and 
friendship that came to naught when investors 
rejected Scorsese's efforts, some have said just to 
punish Lonergan. Sufficient compromises were 
finally achieved, and Margaret was released in 
September 20ll, if you can call being shown in 
one theater in New York and one in Los Angeles 
as "being released:' It returned a gross box office 
of $46,495 on an initial investment (not including 
Broderick's thousands) of $12.5 million. In prac-
tical terms, no one saw the movie. Nonetheless, 
critics have called it a "masterpiece:' The New 
Yorker termed the film "a cinematic wonder:' 
From the very outset of Margaret, Kenneth 
Lonergan probably attempted the impossible. 
Our public cinemas are now the homes of special 
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effects extravaganzas, the purview of super heroes 
in the land of fantasy and science fiction. And 
though that trend was already underway when 
You Can Count on Me was released in 2000, it is 
so far advanced today that enticing an audience to 
sit still for over two and a half hours for a drama 
about a self-centered high school junior, seems a 
fantasy of a different kind and order. Whatever its 
considerable artistic ambitions and merits, as an 
act of commerce Margaret was probably dead on 
arrival from the moment it was conceived. That's 
the bad news-for Kenneth Lonergan, all his sup-
Kenneth Lonergan's scripts 
continually shift the angle 
from which he examines his 
characters, and thus we see them 
in an unusual wholeness, their 
blemishes as well as their beauty. 
porters, and cinephiles of a certain kind, like me. 
The good news is that Margaret is now available 
on DVD and can be appreciated on the home flat 
screen the way we appreciate such superior tele-
vision fare as The Wire, Treme, Mad Men, and 
Homeland. 
Knneth Lonergan's storytelling is rich nd challenging because he refuses to see uman beings in black and white. His 
scripts continually shift the angle from which he 
examines his characters, and thus we see them in 
an unusual wholeness, their blemishes as well as 
their beauty. In You Can Count on Me, Samantha 
Prescott (Linney) would seem the epitome of 
small-town propriety. She is the chief loan offi-
cer at the Scottsville bank in upstate New York. 
She owns her own home. And she provides the 
energetic kind of loving concern for her eight-
year-old son Rudy (Rory Culkin) that has turned 
the nation's so-called "soccer moms" into a potent 
political force. But maybe Samantha is not quite 
the rock of stability and good sense she seems. 
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And perhaps some of the other folks we meet in 
this film are not quite what they seem either. 
The story in You Can Count on Me largely 
concerns Samantha's relationship with her brother 
Terry (Mark Ruffalo). Samantha and Terry were 
orphaned as young children when their parents 
were killed in an auto accident. We do not know 
exactly how they grew up, whether they were 
placed with relatives, in a foster home, or in an 
orphanage. We do know, however, that even as 
adults in their late twenties or so, they remain 
fiercely, if imperfectly, connected to each other; 
their bond, no doubt in significant part, forged 
from their shared suffering. That Samantha fiercely 
cherishes her brother cannot be doubted. When 
she gets the letter announcing that he is coming 
for a visit, her face lights up with a rapturous glow, 
and on the day of his arrival, she dresses up as if 
she's going on a date. But how outwardly different 
these siblings have become. Samantha is resolutely 
middle class and responsible. She earns a good 
income, and she lives modestly well. Terry, in 
contrast, is a mess. He is an itinerant laborer with 
undefined skills in the building trades. He would 
appear to know a little carpentry and perhaps 
some plumbing, but he has certainly never settled 
down. Thoroughly alienated from the small-town 
atmosphere in Scottsville where he and his sister 
were born and where Samantha still lives, Terry 
moves from place to place, never settling for long 
anywhere. Perhaps foremost among her concerns 
about Terry, Samantha worries constantly about 
his whereabouts. He has been in Florida, and he 
has been in Alaska, and, more problematic, he has 
been in jail. 
We have lots of reasons for questioning Terry's 
judgment. When we first meet him, he is taking his 
uncomfortable departure from a troubled young 
woman named Sheila (Gaby Hoffmann). Sheila is 
pregnant with Terry's child, and neither of them 
possesses the money for an abortion. More pain-
fully, Sheila appears far more attached to Terry 
than he to her. Terry seems to have no desire to 
hurt Sheila, but on the other hand he apparently 
lacks the good sense to avoid getting seriously 
involved with someone he does not love. Terry 
visits Samantha for the express purpose of bor-
rowing enough money to fund Sheila's abortion. 
In a host of other ways, Terry continues to exhibit 
throughout the picture a core quality of habitually 
poor decision making. While staying with Sheila, 
he forgets to fetch Rudy from school as requested 
and leaves the child out in the rain. On another 
occasion, Terry takes Rudy to a bar instead of put-
ting him to bed. And at his most irresponsible, 
Terry takes his nephew to see the boy's father 
(Josh Lucas), a scruffy lout who denies his pater-
nity to Rudy's face. 
Just as we begin to 
determine that You Can 
Count on Me is a story of 
diametrical personalities, 
however, we begin to spy 
the cracks in Samantha's 
facade of respectability. In 
a metaphor for her darker 
nature, when authorities 
show up to tell a thirteen-
year-old Samantha about 
her parents' accident, 
the kids for whom she is 
babysitting decide that she 
has sneaked outside for a 
smoke. Nonetheless, we 
are stumped by her later 
teenaged involvement 
with a man like Rudy Sr. The answer perhaps 
lies in Terry's oblique reference to Samantha's 
"wild side." After a time, we conclude that by 
"wild;' Terry probably means "ill-considered:' 
Nine years ago, surrendering to an attraction 
that must surely have been fleeting, Samantha 
allowed herself to become pregnant by Rudy Sr. 
Today, Samantha goes to dinner with an old beau 
(Jon Tenney) she has not dated in over a year and 
nonetheless ends up in the man's bed before the 
end of the evening. And then, in an almost inex-
plicable fit of carnal surrender, she plunges into 
a clandestine affair with her boss Brian Everett 
(Matthew Broderick), a man she does not even 
like and one who does not even pretend he might 
leave his pregnant wife Nancy (Nina Garbiras). 
Samantha isn't even entirely faithful to the per-
son she believes she loves unconditionally: Terry. 
Samantha does care deeply about Terry, but 
her concern often manifests itself in irritation 
and scolding tirades. It's no wonder that he's so 
morose around her. 
In short, Samantha is neither as responsible nor 
as reputable as we initially presume, and certainly 
not as wise (Lonergan cleverly manipulates our 
class prejudice for his own thematic ends). She jus-
tifies running personal errands on company time 
because they inevitably involve child care issues. 
She fails to keep her employers properly notified 
when she has a family crisis. And in so doing she 
exhibits far more in common with Terry than she 
would ever admit. In the film's most artfully subtle 
moment, Samantha coolly threatens Brian with a 
sexual-discrimination lawsuit and flirts with the 
idea of corporate insurrection. At the same time, 
Terry is not quite the uncaring leech we at first 
judge him. His actions are often unwise, and he is 
completely, unreconstructably undisciplined. But 
his heart is often in the right place. He does care 
for his young nephew. Terry tries to teach Rudy 
about carpentry, and he manipulates a barroom 
pool game so that Rudy can sink the winning ball, 
much to the child's pride and pleasure. Terry also 
genuinely cares for his sister. He tells Rudy that the 
boy's greatest luck is the goodness of his mother. 
Terry even cares for Sheila in a way that wins him 
at least partial redemption. 
A significant theme in You Can Count on Me, 
as in Margaret, is the extent to which adults con-
tinue to act like children. We even have a scene 
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in which, like a child, Terry plays intently with 
Rudy's Gameboy. Terry engages in a snit about 
tattling with Rudy that recalls the argument of 
youngsters in a schoolyard. Samantha's sexual 
promiscuity, and Terry's as well, is like that of 
adolescence. Consequences don't enter their con-
sideration. Samantha's trysts with her boss Brian 
initially even take place in his car, just like teenag-
ers on a back-road lovers' lane. 
Lonergan refuses to place blame on the 
usual suspects. The people of Scottsville are not 
the monsters and perverts who stand in every 
small-town storefront created by someone like 
David Lynch. The local sheriff (Adam LeFevre) is 
a man of patience and concern. The local pastor 
(Lonergan) is a man of considerable compassion 
and reluctance to judge. In the end, Lonergan 
avers the role of fate in our lives. The trajectories 
of Samantha's and Terry's lives were no doubt 
unalterably changed by the deaths of their parents. 
Today, they have the virtue of genuinely loving 
each other, but neither can change the nature of 
the other. As a result, they will continue to disap-
point each other for some time to come, maybe 
forever. And that is the downbeat message in this 
film's almost shockingly quiet conclusion. On the 
other hand, in the magic of a thematic paradox, 
their love endures. Terry goes away again, but 
promises to stay in touch, promises to return. And 
maybe he will. And born oflove, maybe he and his 
sister will finally find a way to fulfill each other as 
both of them do so desperately desire. 
S 
amantha and Terry Presscott obviously 
stand for many of us as we try to wend our 
way from youth to adulthood, but the can-
vas of You Can Count on Me is small, a brother 
and a sister in a small town. Margaret is more 
ambitious and explores more and broader themes, 
not in a rural, isolated village but in New York, 
one of the world's busiest and most crowded cit-
ies. Lonergan likes to establish visual metaphors 
from the physical landscape surrounding his 
characters. In You Can Count on Me, the director's 
camera notices a graveyard as Terry's bus takes 
him to visit his sister, establishing that the bond 
that connects them was forged by their parents' 
accidental deaths. And though we can extrapolate 
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lessons for ourselves from the lives of Samantha 
and Terry, Lonergan urges that kind of connec-
tion explicitly in Margaret with his repeated shots 
of New York cityscapes: the crush of pedestrians 
on daytime sidewalks, the endless lights of count-
less high-rises gleaming through the night, the 
inevitable clot of traffic stretching to the urban 
horizon. The characters he deals with in Margaret 
are instructive, but representative. There is a nar-
rative for everyone we pass on a crowded street, 
for everyone tapping fingers in a car waiting for 
the light to change, for everyone in every office 
and apartment from which silver light spills into 
the night-darkened sky. 
Like You Can Count on Me, the story in 
Margaret is propelled by an accident. High-school 
junior, Lisa Cohen (Anna Paquin) runs along a 
daytime Manhattan street, flirting with bus driver 
Gerald Maretti (Mark Ruffalo) at the wheel of his 
Transit Authority bus. Distracted, Gerald runs 
a red light and drives over middle-aged pedes-
trian Monica Patterson (Allison Janney), tearing 
her body to pieces and leaving her only minutes 
to live. Lisa doesn't know Monica, but she rushes 
to hold her while they wait for an ambulance that 
arrives only after Monica has bled to death in 
Lisa's arms. When the police arrive, Gerald and 
Lisa exchange furtive glances and then tell the 
same story: the bus went through the intersection 
on green; Monica walked against the light. 
But, her conscience stricken, Lisa first tells the 
true story to her mother, Broadway actress, Joan 
Cohen (J. Smith Cameron), who observes that 
perhaps Lisa should think of the bus driver and 
his family before returning to the police to correct 
her story. Monica's death was still an accident, 
and acknowledging that the driver was distracted 
will not bring the victim back to life. Particularly 
in retrospect, this is good advice. But Lisa refuses 
to take it. She changes her police report, but the 
police say that even if Gerald was distracted as 
a result of her flirting, Monica's death was still 
an accident and no grounds exist for charges. 
Enraged, Lisa makes contact first with Monica's 
cousin Abigail (Betsy Aidem) and subsequently 
Monica's best friend Emily (Jeannie Berlin). In 
the latter, Lisa finds a kindred angry soul, and 
together Emily and Lisa devise a plan to bring a 
wrongful death suit against Gerald, a court action 
they hope will get him fired. Complications 
ensue. Emily and Lisa have no standing to sue, 
so they do so in Abigail's name. But once Abigail 
is involved, it is clear that she will gladly take 
whatever money can be extracted but cares little 
about anything else in the matter. She and Monica 
weren't even on friendly terms. And, of course, 
Gerald hasn't any money, so the suit ends up 
against his employer, the Transit Authority. One 
wouldn't expect much good to come out of any of 
this, and none does. 
Along the way, how-
ever, we are confronted 
with a series of characters, 
very few of whom elicit 
much in the way of our 
sympathy. Lisa's divorced 
father Karl (Lonergan) 
lives in California and 
stays in occasional con-
tact with his daughter by 
telephone, but his self-
absorption is so noxious 
we can almost smell it. 
When Lisa tells him about 
her bad conscience, his 
first reaction is to invoke 
the advice of a lawyer to 
protect Lisa and himself 
from a prospective, and never threatened, lawsuit. 
Joan is somewhat better. We do believe that her 
caring for her daughter is real, but Joan is also so 
self-absorbed that when she meets Emily, rather 
than talking about Monica, Joan rambles on about 
her own career and how nice it is to enjoy the 
occasional success and attract critical praise in 
the reviews. Emily is an emotional monster. Her 
grief has turned into such fury that she simply 
wants to hurt someone. She isn't ever particu-
larly nice to Lisa, even though Lisa provides her 
the weapon with which to wield her anger. She is 
flat and pointlessly rude to Dave (Michael Ealy), 
the lawyer friend who tries to help her. She cre-
ates a horrible public scene when confronted with 
an insensitive remark by Joan's boyfriend Ramon 
(Jean Reno). And ultimately Emily turns her 
wrath on Lisa, accusing the teenager of "caring 
too easily;' and upbraiding Lisa that "You're not 
the one this is happening to:' That we agree with 
both of these observations in no way lessens the 
cruelty with which they are delivered. 
But if an array of the characters are unsym-
pathetic, Lisa stands foremost among them. She 
is a bright girl, and, except in math, a good stu-
dent. But she is also frighteningly immature and 
needlessly mean. She bullies her younger brother, 
simply because he is too little to stop her. When 
Darren (John Gallagher), the socially shy boy 
who tutors her in math, asks her to the movies, 
An,.lll!l,quin in Margaret. 
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like a cat toying with a trapped mouse, she tries 
to tie him in knots over whether the invitation is a 
"date:' She relates to her imperfect mother with a 
series of sneers, sarcastic remarks, and outbursts, 
and when her mother stands up to her, she threat-
ens to move to California to live with her father. 
When Lisa is with the police, she is needlessly 
combative even before she is denied her desire 
that Gerald be arrested, and afterward she accuses 
the detectives, outside of all context, of being rac-
ists. Outside of school, to his face, she ridicules 
her English teacher (Broderick), even though he is 
trying to look out for her, and she snidely asks her 
math teacher, Mr. Aaron (Matt Damon), if being 
a high-school geometry teacher is "the summit of 
his ambition:' When Mr. Aaron is uncomfortable 
around her, she sniffs that he's "acting just like a 
little kid:' 
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Along with an ingrained nastiness, this last 
jibe is an example of another of Lonergan's themes: 
hypocrisy. Lisa repeatedly acts like a spoiled child, 
yet accuses others of this characteristic. When 
Emily attacks her, Lisa complains, "I don't under-
stand why if I do something wrong, you can't 
just give me a break:' But, of course, her crusade 
against Gerald is a prime example of her doing 
the same thing. Even the few "good" characters 
suffer from hypocrisy. Joan's boyfriend Ramon, a 
Panamanian who has made a fortune in Paris and 
used his wealth to build orphanages in his home 
country, is nonetheless capable of dismissing a 
pro-Israeli argument (he's pro-Palestinian) as a 
"typical Jewish response:' He would recoil at being 
disregarded in that manner but cannot bring him-
self to understand that he has been offensive. 
And as in You Can Count on Me, Lonergan 
once again has things to say about careless sex-
ual behavior. Joan and Ramon move from mere 
acquaintances to bedmates perhaps too soon, cer-
tainly before Joan is sure that Ramon is the man 
with whom she wants to spend the rest of her life. 
But again, Lisa is our chief offender. When we first 
see her with Mr. Aaron in her math classroom, 
Lisa is wearing a skirt so short it barely covers 
her panties, if she's wearing panties. Yet, as she is 
discussing his concern that she used unauthor-
ized assistance on a take-home geometry test, she 
sits in front of him, and akin to Sharon Stone in 
Basic Instinct, ostentatiously crosses her legs in a 
way that flashes him. Because Mr. Aaron does not 
respond, we don't know if he's looking at her at 
that moment or, for certain, even if she has done 
this on purpose, but in her dress and physical 
movements she will win no trophies for appropri-
ate modesty. She is a virgin, however, or at least 
believably claims to be. For after making out with 
Darren at a party and heartlessly telling him that 
she loves him, she calls another boy from her 
school, the drug dealing Paul (Kieran Culkin) and 
asks him to deflower her. That their night of sex 
together seems to reveal her almost utter lack of 
experience and confidence might otherwise elicit 
our sympathy, had her behavior not already turned 
us so stubbornly against her. And what sympathy 
she does command on her night with Paul is soon 
squandered when she goes to Mr. Aaron's house 
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and aggressively seduces him. The teacher flunks 
adulthood for surrender to a teenager, but as Lisa 
admits, the idea, overture, and determination all 
came from her. 
Also akin to You Can Count on Me, Margaret 
worries about the stubborn childishness that 
we cling to. This is related to the theme of self-
absorption discussed above, for any parent knows 
the ways a child can see things from his or her per-
spective alone. It is, thus, no accident that two of 
Joan's party tricks are to sing in the voice of the 
four-year-old Shirley Temple and to cry like a baby 
awakening for a nighttime feeding. Like Samantha 
in You Can Count on Me, when Joan is frustrated, 
she is prone to smash things around her house, to 
sweep a dinner's worth of plates crashing to the 
floor. Mr. Aaron is childish in surrendering to his 
student. Ramon is childish by resorting to con-
tempt rather than rational discussion. Even the 
English teacher is childish for a moment when 
he cannot dissuade a student from repeating the 
same, wrongheaded, extra-textual point in a dis-
cussion about Shakespeare. Elsewhere, Lonergan 
drives home this concern about childishness when 
he has the English teacher read Gerard Manley 
Hopkins's poem, "Spring and Fall, to a Young 
Child;' in which the poet counsels a girl named 
Margaret (hence the movie's title) who is worried 
about the coming of autumn and ends with the 
couplet "It is the blight that man was born for/ It is 
Margaret you mourn for:' In short, ours is a youth-
obsessed culture, and we do ourselves no favors by 
refusing to grow up. 
And there is more. Working from a script 
begun in the months after the attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, there are 
heated discussions about Islamic terrorism and 
the reasons that America is hated by so many in 
the Muslim world. And lest we forget an underly-
ing cause of all that, in his shots of the physical 
environment, Lonergan's camera sometimes spies 
gigantic oil tankers easing into the ports of New 
York harbor. 
In sum, though I am a fan of Kenneth Lonergan 
and an admirer of this movie, I can understand 
why he had such a difficult time producing the 
final cut that was his obligation and prerogative. 
First, I think he was too devoted to all those shots 
of Manhattan streets, buildings, waterways, and 
anonymous people. They interrupt the action 
repeatedly to diminishing effect once we real-
ize the point he is making. And, in every case, he 
lingers on them longer than necessary. They slow 
things down in a way that doesn't serve the movie. 
The more extensive problem, though, stems from 
Lonergan's early decision to make so many of his 
characters so deeply dislikable. Margaret's lineup 
of characters includes few saving graces. We may 
recognize that Emily is suffering over the loss of 
her dear friend, but she doesn't have to be so ugly 
to everyone and so superior in her ugliness to boot. 
We may realize that Mr. Aaron is the pursued, not 
the pursuer, but it is his obligation to resist the 
very kind of temptation he surrenders to. We may 
realize that Ramon is a decent man, but that is no 
defense against his anti-Semitism. We may realize 
that Joan lacks self-confidence and is involved in 
a career that fans the flames of her insecurity, but 
that doesn't excuse her lack of maternal strength. 
We may recognize that Gerald's momentary irre-
sponsibility merits forgiveness, but that doesn't 
forgive his lying, his refusal to accept responsibil-
ity, and his knee-jerk hostility toward Lisa. And 
we may recognize that Lisa's instinctual effort to 
comfort the dying Monica and her subsequent 
pangs of conscience about her role in the accident 
may indicate that someday she may indeed grow 
up, but until the very closing scene we see no solid 
evidence that Lisa has honored her pledge not to 
turn Monica's horrible, tragic death into her "own 
personal moral gymnasium:' I can't help but won-
der if Lonergan didn't stymie himself in his desire 
to save characters that his audience would find so 
distasteful. 
Still, there is not a sliver of doubt that save 
them he intended. And that is why we get the 
film's closing scene, mother and daughter, emo-
tionally broken, holding on to each other for dear 
life. In the complex structure of Margaret's story, 
brilliance lies; in its insistent conclusion, wisdom 
blooms. That we will sin is a given of our human 
nature. That we can be redeemed is the grace 
offered by the divine and the possibility that we 
must all extend to one another. t 
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Brain Memoirs 
Thinking About Thinking 
Harold K. Bush 
J 
UST OVER FORTY YEARS AGO, HAL LINDSEY 
published his harrowing account of the apoc-
alypse, The Late, Great Planet Earth. One of 
Lindsey's key texts for prophesying the end of the 
world was Daniel 12:4, which describes a time 
when "many shall run to and fro, and knowledge 
shall be increased:' Little did he know, in the early 
1970s, how prescient those words would become 
for to day's "millennials" in the light of the Internet's 
climb to cultural dominance. To and fro, indeed. 
Given our peripatetic tendencies, some educa-
tors are becoming alarmist. Recently, it has come 
to our attention that we may be facing a readerly 
apocalypse, that our brains are being radically 
rewired, and that the mark of the beast may very 
well be our IP addresses. The reading habits of the 
young, including university students, are of par-
ticular concern, given that they have never known 
a time when the beast has not been in full control. 
The dire challenges presented to them by the onset 
of the Internet revolution are becoming regular 
headline grabbers in books, magazines, and on the 
web itself. 
Thus, while Hal Lindsey has all but vanished 
from cultural relevance, a new kind of doomsday 
prophet is emerging. Some observers have even 
returned to that obscure verse in Daniel, and the 
explosive growth of the Internet is usually consid-
ered to be the key culprit (along with its ancillary 
accomplice, smartphones, which like God seem 
omniscient, omnipresent, and wired to the heavens 
24/7). The Internet's mind-blowing content fos-
ters a disruptive "to-and-fro-ness" within our fitful 
imaginations, as we surf around the vast ocean of 
data, never settled for very long on any one site. 
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It promotes, in Nicholas Carr's famous formula-
tion, a "shallow" encounter with both print and 
digital texts (The Shallows, 2010). Carr wonders 
if the Internet is doing more than making us stu-
pid: he asks us to face the possibility that computer 
technology (the most powerfully transformative 
medium in world history) has become obsessive 
for many Westerners. To state it in the booming 
popular term, the Internet has an uncanny ability 
to foster neuroplasticity. It also seems to be under-
mining authority by breeding uncritical acceptance 
of virtually any opinion. My students nowadays cite 
with unqualified confidence just about anything 
they find online in their "research" papers. They are 
evidently unable to make useful distinctions or dis-
criminations about the trustworthiness of one site 
over another. 
Debatable as Carr's conclusions may be, what 
I like most about his bestseller is the introductory 
material about his own personal changes in read-
ing and thinking. Carr is very good at drawing in 
older readers (like me) by narrating the changes 
that he has begun to notice more and more (as I 
have noticed them, and perhaps as you have). The 
motif that seems most prominent in Carr's account 
is "distraction:' We troll the shallows because our 
brains have literally been rewired to fixate on 
an everlasting search for more, and better, and 
fresher, input. We have a hard time concentrat-
ing, says Carr, and that restlessness is becoming 
a hard-wired feature of our physical brains, a fea-
ture that, in Carr's view, is contributing to human 
stupidity. His most sinister culprit is Google, for 
its unwieldy stake in our growing obtuseness, as 
famously stated in the title of his cover-essay in 
The Atlantic ("Is Google Making Us Stupid?" July/ 
August 2008). 
Carr's tale is part of a growing trend in some 
sectors of the publishing world right now, a genre 
I would like to call "brain memoirs:' These are the 
autobiographical musings of brains in transition, 
thoughtful accounts of the plasticity of one's brain. 
Brain memoirs can take several forms, such as that 
of the quirky book called Losing It, by William Ian 
Miller (2011), much of which describes how aging 
affects our reading habits and memories (Losing It 
also might scare the hell out of anyone over fifty). 
Miller's book is a metacognitive study of a brain 
looking at itself through the lens of aging and clas-
sical literature. Another example is Alan Jacobs's 
The Pleasures of Reading in an Age of Distraction 
(2011), a beautifully written account of reading by a 
lifelong reader who frets over his changing readerly 
habits. Jacobs hits notes of mild despair and warns 
us against the monster of electronic media (even 
as he learns to like his shiny new Kindle). And like 
Carr, Jacobs is extremely articulate about the titular 
topic of "distraction:' 
Perhaps most influential in academic cir-
cles is Jaron Lanier's quirky yet, at times, moving 
manifesto of 2010, the title of which prophetically 
captures the author's angst: You Are Not a Gadget. 
Lanier's emotional plea for human dignity is remi-
niscent of the great scene in the film Network 
(1976), with countless disturbed Americans lean-
ing out their windows to yell to the winds, "''m as 
mad as Hell and I'm not going to take it anymore!" 
Lanier's jeremiad about the penetration of the 
digital into almost every area of our lives is addi-
tionally provocative given his own legendary status 
as famed programmer and innovator of such con-
cepts as "virtual reality;' a phrase he is said to have 
coined, and the use of "avatars" as graphic depic-
tions of users online. Since he is widely considered 
one of the chief architects of the Internet as we now 
encounter it every day, Lanier's resounding critique 
of its dehumanizing and anti-intellectual effects is 
trenchant and highly informed. 
These and other forceful volumes are taking 
advantage of the wave of popular neuroscience 
that has emerged recently. Thanks in large part to 
the extremely sophisticated machinery available to 
research scientists today, in tandem with the highly 
creative experiments that psychiatrists and neuro-
scientists come up with for using those machines, we 
have learned more in the last twenty years about the 
way the brain works and which areas do what types 
of thinking than in all of human history before. This 
publishing boom began with the extremely suc-
cessful works of Malcolm Gladwell, especially his 
wonderfully-titled and well-written volume Blink 
(2007), which has set the bar for sales and slickness, 
and has become the popular primer on the brain's 
plasticity (its ability to reform itself and establish 
new connections). Gladwell illustrates the brain's 
We have learned more in the last 
twenty years about the way the 
brain works and which areas do 
what types of thinking than in all 
of human history before. 
ability to "thin-slice" reality: to "know" something 
in the twinkling of an eye, thus the title Blink. And 
Gladwell has famously exploited the flourishing 
neuroscience of the past two decades, sometimes 
to much critical scorn for his non sequiturs and 
overgeneralizations. (More nuanced and motivated 
readers might go on to Norman Doidge's influential 
2007 volume, The Brain that Changes Itself) Despite 
the book's flaws of methodology and logic, Blink is 
compelling reading (as are his other volumes, espe-
cially The Tipping Point [2007] and Outliers [2011]), 
and Gladwell remains the pop-guru of this emerg-
ing field. 
Combining vast scientific data with the popular, 
narrative-driven exposition perfected by Gladwell, 
many other interesting books have appeared recently 
in this emerging genre. Two of the most popular of 
2012 have been Imagine: How Creativity Works by 
Jonah Lehrer and The Power of Habit: Why We Do 
What We Do in Life and Business by Charles Duhigg. 
Both are filled with intriguing stories and personali-
ties, and both are good at introducing (some of) the 
scientific data to general readers. In all, the books 
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mentioned here so far, along with numerous oth-
ers (many of which are often featured prominently 
on the front shelves at Barnes and Noble) comprise 
a growing and influential subfield in popular non-
fiction. We should also remember that this genre 
of pop-scholarship hardly existed as recently as ten 
years ago. Thus, it seems that such "brain memoirs" 
and related studies of the brain "thinking about 
thinking" are here to stay. 
How are we to remain as "wise 
as serpents, and as innocent as 
doves" in light of the growing 
body of literature about 
our brains and our lifelong 
stewardship of them? 
d yet, hardly anyone has thought much 
r written about the implications of these 
aterials for the study and practice of 
spirituality. For readers of this journal, that per-
spective would feature most prominently Christian 
beliefs and disciplines. And so I want to conclude 
by asking: What is the upshot of these findings for 
us as Christians? How are we to remain as "wise as 
serpents, and as innocent as doves" in light of the 
growing body of literature about our brains and our 
lifelong stewardship of them? And how might we 
augment a pious and robust spiritual practice with 
the help of the findings of current brain science? 
A full and satisfying set of responses to these 
challenging questions is well beyond the scope of 
this essay. It would be a great book to write, one day. 
But for now, I would like to speak personally about 
how some of these insights have had an effect on 
my own thinking. As such, perhaps this is one more 
attempt -on a very small scale-of writing a brief 
version of a brain memoir-in this case, my own. 
One very intriguing insight that is becoming 
clear in contemporary neuroscience is that we have 
the ability to "program;' or manipulate for good, 
our own brains, a technique that can allow us to find 
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increasing happiness in repetitive, habitual activi-
ties. The more we do something regularly, the more 
joyful and peaceful the activity becomes. In other 
words, through habits and exercise and discipline, 
even hard work like scholarship, or weightlifting, 
can become satisfying and foster happiness. Habits 
of discipline and practice eventually bring us more 
and more joy, and this seems likely for just about 
anything we do habitually-both good habits and 
bad habits, so beware. What at first seems like 
boring and repetitive work-practicing piano, gar-
dening, walking the dogs-can end up becoming 
an almost addictive behavior that we feel compelled 
to do every day. 
To say it another way: If we do something 
mindfully, over and over, with patience and close 
observation, there is great joy to be found there. 
One intriguing book that documents this is titled 
simply, Thanks! How the New Science of Gratitude 
Can Make You Happier (2007). Thanks! was written 
by Robert Emmons, editor of a prominent psychol-
ogy journal. The upshot here is that thankfulness 
is largely a learned behavior. The more we prac-
tice being thankful, the more thankful we become, 
intuitively. If we telescope this out to all of the vir-
tues, or the "fruits of the spirit" (Galatians 5), we 
might think about how fruitful attitudes like love, 
joy, peace, and patience are also things we can prac-
tice, improve at, and allow to become instinctive. 
Just like free throws in basketball, or difficult bar 
chords like F on a guitar, they become internalized. 
These may be obvious pointers regarding 
how our brains work and reconnect in productive 
ways, but I also think we must beware that we do 
not become "shallow" readers or shallow follow-
ers of God. We need to keep working at the deep 
things, pushing ourselves to read the deep books, 
focusing on the deep conversations. All of these 
activities are under siege in our 24/7 digital world, 
and I hope this will not sound too dire or too pretty. 
But yes, I am concerned: perhaps not so concerned 
as Nicholas Carr (let alone Hal Lindsey), but seri-
ously wondering how I can mindfully practice a 
kind of distance from the more sinister influences 
of the Internet and other technologies. To be blunt: 
I worry about how my own brain is changing, in 
many ways negatively, as it has been shaped by digi-
tal technologies. It is harder to read for long periods 
of time; I'm much more easily distracted; and in 
short I often find myself longing for "connection;' 
hoping for that certain email (usually disappointed, 
by the way), or just surfing around and seeing what 
is new in the world. But even as my MacBook boots 
up, I recall a wistful observation from Marilynne 
Robinson: "I miss civilization, and I want it back:' 
And so, in that spirit, I would like to end with 
a very brief list of ideas about how to balance our 
digital lives. 
• Digital fasting: I try to turn off the computer 
from about midday Saturday through Monday 
morning. And yet it is hard; very hard. I do 
not always make it. 
• Reading out loud long passages, including 
whole chapters from the Bible: we are doing 
this weekly in a study group I lead. Americans 
have almost forgotten how to listen to height-
ened speech. 
• Refusing the tyranny of the urgent that 
is rampant among my students and their 
occasionally annoying or insulting emails: I 
encourage face-to-face encounters that seem 
to me more humane than code on a screen. 
• Often leaving behind my cellphone: especially 
on walks or hikes, but also at the bookstore or 
other shopping venues, at films or concerts, 
parties or dinners, or other events. Certainly 
church (every week several cellphones ring in 
the sermon; I guess I just don't hear them dur-
ing the worship). Frankly, I am astonished by 
the number of lit-up screens that dot darkened 
theaters these days, and I often have to ask 
other audience members to please shut it off. 
• Download articles and print them out to read: 
too much staring into screens already. 
• Silence. As much and as long as possible, 
in a host of different manners and settings 
throughout my week. 
I am sure there are many other practices that the 
spiritually-inclined have devised to wrestle against 
the imposing forces of the Internet in our lives. And 
honestly I would love to hear about them: please 
send me an email and tell me about them. But in 
closing, it strikes me that I do not wish to come 
across holier than thou in any of this. I am strug-
gling with it all too. Like the authors mentioned 
above, I am becoming ever more alert to the ways 
my brain seems to have changed from younger days. 
Part of it is surely simple aging. But part of it is all 
this electronic noise and the concomitant "shallow" 
encounters with the newest, the flashiest. Probably 
if you have read this far, you are wrestling too. 
So let us just say it this way: We all need to be 
mindful, as stewards of those wonderful organs we 
call brains, of how we form them through habit-
lest we be drawn even further into the maw of the 
beast (is that too apocalyptic?). The good news is 
that we can do it; neuroscience now supports a view 
that there are specific, habitual acts of moral agency 
humans can deploy in the interests of their brains. 
It is ennobling to discover that we can in large part 
co-create the kind of brain we would like to have, 
and that it is up to each of us to nurture and cultivate 
our brains from today and through the balance of 
our earthly lives. All of this, however, does require 
work, and echoing most of the authors above, per-
haps that is the key message I would like to impress 
upon this generation of frenetic, millennia! college 
students-and myself. But after all, maybe it is not 
all so fresh. Henry David Thoreau wrote similarly 
over 160 years ago: "As a single footstep will not 
make a path on the earth, so a single thought will 
not make a pathway in the mind. To make a deep 
physical path, we walk again and again. To make a 
deep mental path, we must think over and over the 
kind of thoughts we wish to dominate our lives:' 
And so I ask you, dear reader: what sorts of 
thoughts do you wish to dominate your life? 'f 
Harold K. Bush, author of Lincoln in His 
Own Time (2011) and Mark Twain and the 
Spiritual Crisis of His Age (2007}, is Professor 
of English at Saint Louis University. His email 
address is bushhk@slu.edu, and he wel-
comes your comments (and confessions) on 
t his art icle. 
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DESIRE 
It arrives on your doorstep 
swaddled like an orphan. 
You glance around, check 
the mailbox for a note. Nothing. 
You feed it. It grows, begins 
to walk, helps itself 
to the olives in the fridge, 
sucking out the pimentos 
and spitting them on the counter. 
Before long, it's lounging 
in its underwear, scratching itself, 
telling you, I'm hungry, 
make me a sandwich. 
Tuna, no crust. 
Or you starve it, 
shut it in a coat closet 
for weeks under a heap 
of forgotten shoes, turn the TV up 
till its crying stops and you kill 
the noise, soak in the silence, 
believe things are back 
the way they were. 
But when everything's still 
and you lie awake in bed, 
it whooshes about the house 
singing your name 
in the thin, bright tones 











The Knight of Faith and The Dark Knight 
Ross Moret 
A T FIRST GLANCE, AND PERHAPS EVEN AT second and third glances, it may seem strange to place the names of S0ren 
Kierkegaard and Bruce Wayne in the same sen-
tence. However, Christopher Nolan's recent 
trilogy of Batman films-Batman Begins (2005), 
The Dark Knight (2008), and The Dark Knight 
Rises (2012)-explore many of the same themes 
as the work of the Danish, existentialist philoso-
pher. Nolan's hero confronts fear, dread, loss, and 
isolation, human experiences that are among 
Kierkegaard's deepest concerns. And, despite the 
darkness, both Nolan and Kierkegaard end up 
telling uplifting stories in which the possibility 
of redemption is always present, even amidst the 
worst difficulties. Bruce Wayne achieves a kind 
of redemption, or what Kierkegaard would call 
repetition, as he proceeds through a long and 
difficult journey marked by despair, faith, and 
sacrifice. 
Very little imagination is required to make 
a superficial comparison between the charac-
ters of Job, the biblical subject of Kierkegaard's 
Repetition, and Bruce Wayne. Both are wealthy 
individuals forced to undergo ordeals at the 
hands of demonic figures. Satan strips Job of his 
family, his wealth, and his health. His friends 
and his wife come to offer criticism, even blam-
ing him for his troubles. In the end, Job receives 
everything back two-fold. Similarly, Wayne's par-
ents are murdered by Joe Chill, his mansion is 
burnt to the ground by Ra's al Ghul, his great love 
and oldest friend is slaughtered by the Joker, his 
fortune is stripped by Talia al Ghul, and his body 
is broken by Bane. His faithful butler, Alfred, 
tries to convince him to give up on Batman while 
Selina Kyle looks to persuade him to abandon 
Gotham. In the end, Bruce also receives every-
thing back two-fold, but his returns are spiritual 
rather than material. In Kierkegaard's terminol-
ogy, Bruce Wayne achieves a repetition. 
What is repetition for Kierkegaard, and 
how is it achieved? Constantin Constantius, the 
pseudonym under which Kierkegaard published 
Repetition, compares it with the concept of recol-
lection. Recollection and repetition, he says, "are 
the same movement, except in opposite directions" 
(131). The concept of recollection is drawn from 
Greek metaphysics. It refers to our ability through 
physical experiences of the material world and 
intellectual effort to recall the eternal, ideal forms 
that provide a source of meaning to all reality. 
Recollection is a process of remembering; repeti-
tion, in contrast, is the active practice of becoming. 
Repetition is a future-oriented effort that entails 
resolutely trusting God, despite our experiences 
with losses in the past and uncertainties of what is 
to come. Through repetition, we seek the whole-
ness of eternity not in memories of the past, but 
in ethical action that offers hope for restoration 
of ourselves and the world. (On this complicated 
and elusive notion in Kierkegaard's thought, see 
Mooney 1998; also Jackson 1999,49 n 44.) 
A repetition of this kind occurs when Batman 
saves Police Commissioner Gordon's son from the 
deranged Harvey Dent near the end of The Dark 
Knight. In the scene, Dent holds a gun to Gordon's 
son and forces Gordon to reassure the child with 
the words, "It's going to be alright, son:' Dent does 
not realize, of course, that these words were twice 
spoken to a young Bruce Wayne in a similar situa-
tion: first by his dying father and second by a kind 
police sergeant, none other than Jim Gordon. 
Bruce heard these words as a helpless young boy, 
and he spent seven years training so that the next 
time he heard them he would be able to do some-
thing about the situation; he saves Gordon's son in 
a repetition. 
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For Kierkegaard, however, repetition is both an 
ethical and a religious phenomenon. While Job, the 
biblical subject of Repetition, would not have expe-
rienced a repetition if he had not acted in a way that 
was pleasing to God, ultimately it was God who saw 
to it that Job received everything back twice-over. 
For true repetition then, human action is required 
but is not sufficient; faith is required as well. 
Nolan's version of Gotham City 
de-emphasizes the most fantastic elements of 
Batman's comic books, opting to portray a city 
that seems very much like one to which we might 
pay a visit. Likewise, while Nolan incorporates 
philosophical and religious themes into his films, 
they tend to be existential rather than transcen-
dent in tone. 
It might not surprise us, then, to find that 
Bruce Wayne's faith is not in God, but in some-
thing much more mundane: Gotham City. Or, 
perhaps to be more precise, Wayne places his faith 
in the goodness of the people of Gotham City. 
Two scenes are sufficient to illustrate the point. 
The first demonstrates a chief difference between 
Bruce Wayne and the vigilantes of the League 
of Shadows, the leader of which, Ra's Al Ghul, 
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deemed Gotham City so corrupt that it warranted 
complete destruction. In a scene from Batman 
Begins that conjures up images of Abraham bar-
tering with God over Sodom and Gomorrah, 
Wayne begs Ra's Al Ghul for more time to turn 
Gotham around and cries out that "there are good 
people here:' In a scene in The Dark Knight, Wayne 
demonstrates faith in the people of Gotham when 
the Joker manipulates hostages in an attempt to 
demonstrate the superficiality of "society's rules:' 
The Joker plants explosives on two ferries that are 
attempting to leave the city. One ferry is filled with 
convicts, and the other with average citizens. The 
passengers on each ferry are provided with a trig-
ger to detonate the other boat and told that in a 
few minutes both ferries will explode unless one 
ferry destroys the other. When Gordon is noti-
fied of the situation he tells Batman in desperation 
that "every second we take, those people on the 
ferries get closer to blowing each other up:' But 
Wayne, as Batman, steadfastly replies, "That won't 
happen!" For Wayne, for Job, and as we shall see 
for Abraham, no amount of personal effort or 
integrity can bring about a repetition. Getting 
back what has been lost can only occur by virtue 
of the object of faith, which Kierkegaard dubs "the 
absurd" in perhaps his most famous work, Fear 
and Trembling. 
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard's pseud-
onym, Johannes de Silentio, speaks primarily of 
two kinds of figures, the knight of faith, exem-
plified by Abraham, who, in Genesis 22, was 
commanded to sacrifice his son Isaac, and the 
knight of infinite resignation, a subset of which 
is the tragic hero. "The difference between the 
tragic hero and Abraham;' de Silentio writes, "is 
very obvious. The tragic hero is still within the 
ethical;' the universal social rules by which we 
live our lives among others (Fear and Trembling, 
59). For the tragic hero, to go beyond that which 
everyone, everywhere and at all times, should do 
is a transgression. For the knight of faith though, 
the particular situation becomes higher than the 
universal rules by means of paradoxical faith. It is 
only by means of a direct and individual relation 
to God through faith, which de Silentio argues 
leads to "the teleological suspension of the ethi-
cal;' that Abraham can be saved. According to the 
universal, Abraham is a murderer; according to 
the paradox, he is the father of faith. 
But such faith has further ramifications. Both 
the knight of faith and the knight of infinite res-
ignation fortify themselves against the changes 
of the finite world by relating to that which is 
infinite: the tragic hero to the universal and the 
knight of faith to the object of faith. Were a tragic 
hero given the command given to Abraham, he 
would have carried out the sacrifice but would 
have given up all hope upon beginning to climb 
the mountain. Abraham, though, never gave up 
hope. He was ready to sacrifice Isaac, but he was 
also ready to receive him back with joy. Whereas 
the knight of infinite resignation gives up the 
world, the knight of faith receives the world back 
again by virtue of belief in the absurd. 
Images of Abrahamic sacrifice are something of 
a motif in Nolan's Batman films. In Batman Begins, 
Bruce Wayne lays in wait to shoot his parents' mur-
derer in front of a huge crowd in broad daylight, 
but just as he is about to pull the trigger a mob goon 
shoots the man instead. In The Dark Knight, the 
Joker threatens to commit a murder every day that 
Batman's identity remains a secret; however, just as 
Wayne steps forward to take responsibility, Harvey 
Dent declares himself to be the Batman. 
Perhaps the most interesting such scene, 
and the most relevant, occurs at the climax of 
The Dark Knight, when Batman chooses to take 
the guilt of Dent's (now Two-Face) crimes upon 
himself. This scene recalls the opening pages 
of Fear and Trembling, where de Silentio offers 
four imaginative renditions of how the sacrifice 
of Isaac might have played out were Abraham a 
knight of infinite resignation rather than a knight 
of faith. The first rendering is worthy of quotation 
at length: 
Abraham climbed Mount Moriah, but 
Isaac did not understand him. Then 
Abraham turned away from him for a 
moment, but when Isaac saw Abraham's 
face again, it had changed: his gaze was 
wild, his whole being was sheer terror. 
He seized Isaac by the chest, threw him to 
the ground, and said, "Stupid boy, do you 
think I am your father? I am an idolater. 
Do you think it is God's command? No 
it is my desire:' Then Isaac trembled and 
cried out in his anguish: "God in heaven, 
have mercy on me, God of Abraham, have 
mercy on me; if I have no father on earth, 
then you be my father!" But Abraham said 
softly to himself, "Lord God in heaven, I 
thank you; it is better that he believes me 
a monster than that he should lose faith 
in you:' ( 11) 
The similarities between the film's climax and 
de Silentio's first imaginative construction of the 
Genesis 22 sacrifice are striking. Here Batman 
is like the ram in the thicket. Wayne functions 
as Abraham. Dent has shifted from his role as 
the ram to become a god-character, a symbol 
of the goodness of Gotham. And the people of 
Gotham City have entered the picture in the role 
of Isaac, those whose faith must be maintained 
through deception. Gordon declares that when 
the people learn of Dent's fall to madness they, 
"will lose hope:' Batman decides to deceive them 
in order to maintain their faith. "Because some-
times the truth isn't good enough. Sometimes 
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people deserve more. Sometimes people deserve 
to have their faith rewarded:' Batman seems to 
operate under his own faith-inspired teleological 
suspension of the ethical. He transgresses the rule 
of law, to which everyone everywhere is subject 
and according to which he is a criminal, worthy 
of life in prison. Batman, however, is not inter-
ested in following the rules: he is interested in the 
redemption of Gotham. "I can do those things;' 
he tells Gordon, "because I'm not a hero-not like 
Dent. I am whatever Gotham needs me to be:' 
Batman's death provides a 
similar dramatic example, and 
his faith in the goodness of the 
city is rewarded. He resigns 
everything; however, this time 
he grasps everything as well. His 
repetition is complete. 
But if Batman somehow believes that he 
operates beyond the ethical, Bruce Wayne suffers 
mightily from having made this sacrifice. While 
his actions follow those of de Silentio's first imag-
inative construction, the fallout is closer to the 
second rendition: "From that day henceforth, 
Abraham was old; he could not forget that God 
had ordered him to do this. Isaac flourished as 
before, but Abraham's eyes were darkened and 
he saw joy no more" (12). Indeed, while Gotham 
seems to have improved, this is how we find Bruce 
Wayne in the opening scenes of the third film, The 
Dark Knight Rises-aged beyond his years, unable 
to move beyond the death of his beloved Rachel, 
and haunted by the deception regarding Harvey 
Dent. The word that Kierkegaard might use for 
Wayne's mindset at this point is despair, which 
the pseudonym Anti-Climacus describes in The 
Sickness Unto Death as the desire "to want to be 
rid of oneself" (147). Alastair Hannay helpfully 
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glosses this explanation by writing that despair, 
for Anti-Climacus, is "a response to whatever it is 
about one's 'self' that makes one unhappy being 
it, its particular defects, its contingent historical 
situation, the human condition as such, or cer-
tain demands implicit in the notion of selfhood" 
(1997, 332). 
It is clear to those around him that Bruce 
Wayne wants to be rid of himself. Alfred, Wayne's 
butler and oldest friend, fears not that Wayne 
will fail if he returns as Batman, but that Wayne's 
despair has finally reached suicidal proportions. 
And Bane, the villain of the film and a leader in 
the rejuvenated League of Shadows, even refuses 
to kill Wayne because, as he says to Wayne, "You 
do not fear death, you welcome it:' But this 
moment is the beginning of Wayne's ultimate 
repetition. Bane puts Wayne in a prison designed 
to maximize despair by providing a glimmer 
of hope-the prison has no ceiling. Wayne has 
fallen in such a hole before but was taught by his 
father the meaning of such setbacks. "Why do we 
fall;' his father asked. "So we can learn to pick 
ourselves up." And Wayne experienced despair 
once before, when he languished for years after 
the death of his parents before attempting to 
be rid of himself by killing their murderer in 
front of a large crowd. He found faith and pur-
pose, however, like his father, in working for the 
redemption of Gotham. Ultimately he became 
the Batman. Now he must become the Batman 
once again, but before he can do that he must 
climb out of this prison. He tries twice, crash-
ing against the wall as a rope saves him from 
perishing. Then, on the third attempt, he does 
something absurd; he makes the climb without a 
rope and, in the most strikingly Kierkegaardian 
of images, makes a great leap to freedom. It is also 
a leap to faith. He resolves to trust the cat bur-
glar Selina Kyle even after she betrayed him. And 
when he is forced to sacrifice the Batman once 
again, and this time Bruce Wayne with him, all is 
not lost but gained. His parents' deaths, which we 
are told in Batman Begins shocked the city into 
saving itself, ultimately drove Wayne to become 
the Batman. Batman's death provides a similar 
dramatic example, and his faith in the goodness 
of the city is rewarded. He resigns everything; 
however, this time he grasps everything as well. 
His repetition is complete. 
A reading of this kind begs the question, were 
these themes intentionally incorporated into the 
films? Ultimately, the question is both unanswer-
able and largely immaterial, for the mere fact that 
we can discuss themes such as these in this man-
ner of detail demonstrates that these films provide 
a level of sophistication and a depth of vision 
worth talking and thinking about. And that, after 
all, is the genius of both Kierkegaard and of the 
biblical stories of Abraham and Job upon which 
he meditates; they draw us to struggle with great 
questions and to search out the inadequacy of our 
easy, pat answers. Those of us with religious sen-
sibilities might chaff at the reduction of faith to 
finite and fallible humanity, and in my mind we 
are right to do so. But perhaps then we are asking 
more of The Dark Knight than he can provide. 
We still need those old Knights of Faith after all. ,_ 
Ross Moret is a graduate of Valparaiso 
University's MALS program and is currently 
a doctoral student in Religion, Ethics, and 
Philosophy at Florida State University. 
The author expresses his thanks to Sophie 
Lenarz-Coy Moret and John Moret for their 
helpful comments on this essay. 
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SATURDAY: ANIMATED CHERRY 
Sometimes the dream gets muddled: 
one night, it's barn swallows; another, 
a gold rooster that flares up from double 
crust when the first cooled piece gets cut. 
Always, you're amazed that feathers come 
out clean, survive the oven's fire: Abednegos 
with wings. And it's your hands covered 
in canned cherry filling. Right before 
waking, it turns to red syrup-or blood 
dried from that day's slaughter-or the 
notyetbaby lost while picking apples. 
But in this dream, the daughter lives and 
the animals won't die. They're reborn into 
pale eggshells, they break free from pie plate, 
up from bubbling filling phoenix, and each 
speaking things you later can't recall. All 
you know is that the table's full-the hobo 
John, the minister's wife, your children young 
with school friends. They laugh and gape in 
wonder, as if such unexpected guests were 




Turn That Stuff Down 
The Need for Silence in Music 
Jennifer Forness 
0 LDER GENERATIONS FREQUENTLY complain that their children's music "all sounds the same:' A recent study pub-
lished in Scientific Report confirms this complaint: 
pop music really is getting louder. "Measuring 
the Evolution in Contemporary Western Popular 
Music" examined 464,411 distinct music record-
ings from 1955 to 2010 available in the Million 
Song Dataset. Researchers ran the songs through 
a series of complex algorithms to quantify har-
monic sequences, timbre, and loudness of music 
in a variety of genres, including rock, pop, hip-
hop, metal, and electronic. The study found that 
over the years, pop music has moved toward 
simpler harmonic progressions, more predict-
able and consistent timbres, and overall louder 
volume (Sera et al2012). 
That current pop music has fewer harmo-
nies and timbres is not surprising. Much of what 
draws youth to popular music today is the "beat" 
of the music rather than interesting progressions 
and sound combinations. If you listen to any pop 
radio station for long, you cannot help but notice 
that much of the music is very similar. Blogger 
Scicurious recently (August 13, 2012, http:/ /sci-
entopia.org/blogs/scicurious) pointed this out. 
The first twenty seconds of Nicki Minaj's "Turn 
Me On" consist of eight bars of synthesized beats 
followed by the lyrics "Doctor, doctor, need you 
bad, hold me babe" sung over the same chord. 
Snoop Dogg's "Sweat" opens with four bars of 
synthesized beats followed by the lyrics "Can 
you be my doctor? Can you fix me up?" over the 
same chord. If you are not listening carefully, you 
might not even notice when the song changes. 
Even more worrying than the homogeneity of 
recent pop music is its increasing volume. Recent 
changes in recording technology have resulted in 
records becoming louder, a phenomenon known 
as the "loudness wars:' In today's digital formats, 
music is compressed to fit into a smaller space. 
This technique has the unfortunate consequence 
of eliminating many dynamic contrasts. Instead 
of relying on dynamic contrast, the recording 
industry has adopted the philosophy that the 
louder the record is, the easier it will be for peo-
ple to recognize it and for the record to become 
a hit. Matt Mayfield's "The Loudness War" on 
YouTube illustrates the unfortunate effects this 
approach has on music (http://www. youtube. 
com/watch?v=3Gmex_ 4hreQ). Mayfield plays 
the beginning of Paul McCartney's "Figure of 
Eight;' noting how much punch the drums have 
when they enter. He then plays the song as if it 
had been recorded with today's compression lev-
els and demonstrates how much louder the track 
is. When the track is compressed, the drums lose 
their punch, and the song becomes less effective. 
While engineers and producers have played a 
significant role in making pop music louder, the 
artists are not without fault. Many artists have 
pandered to changing tastes in pop music and 
have written simpler, less dynamic songs. Much 
of today's popular music has few or no breaks in 
the volume; the songs are just loud from begin-
ning to end. Unfortunately, the listener then loses 
all the benefits of quiet and silence in music. The 
listener needs periods of rest to react to a partic-
ular word or phrase that the artist has decided is 
important. The contrast of loud and soft enables 
the listener to explore how the music is affecting 
him or her and to interact with the music and 
use it in a meaningful way. The lack of dynamic 
range prevents the listener from engaging with 
the music in any but a superficial way. 
A closer look at the punk/alternative band 
Green Day demonstrates both how silence can be 
used to great effect and how the lack of dynamic 
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contrast is a detriment. Their 1994 breakout album 
Dookie featured a variety of songs about coming 
of age in suburbia. The song "Longview;' with its 
iconic bass line, explores the monotony of living 
in the suburbs. The song starts off with the walk-
ing bass already creating boredom by repeating 
itself four times before Billie Armstrong begins 
to sing. The soft shuffle of the toms on the drum 
set along with the bass give us time to absorb 
how bored Armstrong is as he changes "channels 
for an hour or two I Twiddle my thumbs just for 
a bit:' Because the beginning is soft, the listener 
is struck by the force of Armstrong's anger in the 
chorus when the guitar begins to strum force-
fully along with Armstrong's cry to "bite my lips 
and close my eyes I Take me away to paradise:' 
The contrast of soft and loud gives us time to feel 
the tedium of living in the suburbs. 
Almost twenty years later, Green Day's newly 
released album, jUno!, shows how the chang-
ing music industry has affected the quality of 
the music. The song "Kill the DJ" harkens back 
to Green Day's punk roots with its insistence on 
killing "the man." The track starts loudly with a 
harsh minor guitar riff. Armstrong immediately 
butts up against religion by complaining about 
"Christian soldiers I Filled with mind jivin' 
control:' Continuing with the same loud guitar 
riff, Armstrong commands, "Someone kill the 
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DJ, shoot the f***ing DJ." The rest of the lyrics 
bring up angry complaints against religious and 
cultural authorities and focuses mostly on the 
phrase, "someone kill the Dr' In fact, Armstrong 
uses variations of that phrase thirty times in the 
song. Unfortunately, Armstrong never gives us 
enough of a break from his angry complaints to 
think about who the DJ is and why we should 
be upset with him. Instead, all the listener gets 
is the unchanging angry guitar riff throughout 
the whole song. Unlike "Longview;' which gives 
us time to wallow in our boredom, "Kill the DJ" 
slams the listener over the head with the same 
relentless complaint without giving the listener 
space to explore how or why one might want to 
get rid of "the man:' 
Green Day's journey from "Longview" to 
"Kill the DJ" illustrates how much louder and less 
interesting much of popular music has become. 
"Kill the DJ" bows to the whims of current listen-
ers, while "Longview" falls into the tradition of 
more dynamic bands such as U2 and The Beatles, 
as well as most of Western history's popular 
music. U2's "Where the Streets Have No Name" 
engages the listener through its increasing sonic 
ride. The nearly two minutes of crescendo at the 
beginning of the song continue to rise once the 
vocals peak at the end of the lyrics before begin-
ning a slow descent to the end. The rise and fall 
at both ends of the song give us time to absorb 
the lyrics of the text. Going back further to The 
Beatles, we hear the word painting in songs like 
"Let It Be;' where the music always gets softer on 
the phrase "Whisper words of wisdom I Let it 
be;' making sure the listener has to engage more 
closely as the song gets quieter. 
Of course, silence in music extends beyond 
the popular music of Green Day and The Beatles 
to classical music. Impressionists like Debussy 
use silence to great effect, giving the listener 
time to reflect on nature and space. Beethoven 
explores the space between loud and soft, help-
ing the listener experience the extreme ranges of 
human emotions. The alternation of recitatives, 
arias, and choruses in a Bach cantata gives the lis-
tener time to hear and reflect on the word of God. 
The music-and the silence-to which one lis-
tens encourages meditation on the meaning and 
emotions in the music. One listens and receives 
the richness of music through its silences. 
Great pieces of music are meaningful 
because the space which silence provides reso-
nates with human needs and experiences. Silence 
rings true to the listener because it transcends. 
Spiritual practices have always recognized this 
need. Practices like visualization, prayer, and 
meditation invite the faithful to become aware 
of themselves and the ways in which God speaks 
to them. Silence becomes a prayerful conversa-
tion during which one speaks to and listens to 
God. In Keeping Silence: Christian Practices 
for Entering Stillness (Moorehouse Publishing, 
2002), C. W. McPherson writes that "cultivating 
silence enables us to understand and recover our 
own humanity; it serves as a catalyst, bringing 
the presence of God into our lives and into the 
world" ( 6). Silence in spiritual practices, as in 
music, allows one to meditate on words or ideas, 
reflect on their meaning in one's life, and explore 
how they will affect one's thoughts and actions. 
As faith practices demonstrate, silence is 
essential to meeting our emotional and spiritual 
needs. Perhaps this study will convince at least 
a few song writers and performers that we need 
dynamics and silence in music. Maybe we can 
move beyond the loudness wars and finally turn 
the volume back down. f 
Jennifer Forness is the choir director at 
Fisher Middle School and Ewing High School 
in Ewing, New Jersey. She lives in Princeton, 
New Jersey with her husband and baby girl. 
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RUMBLE STRIP 
Speeding down the interstate at seventeen 
in my parents' Thunderbird, I am out to show 
I am fearless. Eighty seems a lifetime ago, 
gauges rising, grill grinning at the GMC Jimmy 
rattling in the passing lane. Cheers are heard 
on the CB radio. My boyfriend's hands are pressed 
against the dash. He looks at me, forehead creased, 
speeding down the interstate in my parents' Thunderbird. 
I am not fearless. I can't prove that I'll make it 
past ninety with my future husband I will meet 
four years down this road. A future daughter sits 
buckled in and yells, "Slow down!" son kicks my seat 
and points, "TRUCK! TRUCK!" never consider 
parents, younger brothers, my nervous passenger 
or his future wife and daughters, families 
and cars I pass as if I have nothing to lose 
or gain on this freeway, dotted white lines 
speeding by on this open road, like ellipses. 
Sarah Wells 
No Truth or Reconciliation 
Patrick Flanery's Absolution 
Joanne Myers 
T
HE CHARACTERS IN PATRICK FLANERY'S 
novel seem unable to believe in the pos-
sibility for grace evoked by its title. 
Absolution follows two white South Africans, Sam 
Leroux and Clare Wald, as they try to make sense 
of both their interlocking 
spliced with sections that narrate Sam's child-
hood experiences in the third-person and with 
excerpts from a fictionalized memoir that Clare 
is about to publish and that, in a further twist, is 
also entitled Absolution. Quite early in the novel, 
Flanery lets readers know 
that Sam and Clare have 
more than professional ties, 
but their personal connec-
tion comes to light sooner 
rather than later, serving as 
a less significant driver of 
the plot than subsequent, 
more significant revelations 
that entangle them further. 
personal histories and their 
ties to the violent politics 
of their nation in the apart-
heid- and post-apartheid 
eras. As the novel's multiple 
plots unfold, absolution-
for crimes both personal 
and political-is desired but 
also deferred, an infinitely 
vanishing point toward 
which Flanery's charac-
ters move without hope of 
arrival. Professional story-
tellers of different sorts, 
Clare and Sam nonetheless 
~"""" 
Absolution 
In her first-person nar-
rative, Clare is the character 
more obviously seeking for-
giveness. These sections 
detail her wary interactions 
with Sam, whose schol-
arly acumen she regularly 
insults, but they also trace 
her pained attempts to 
understand her daughter 
Laura, an anti-apartheid 
militant who went missing 
years before and is pre-
PATR I CK F LA N ER Y 
seem to have lost faith in 
narrative's ability to cap-
ture the truth. And without 
truth, the novel suggests, 
what kind of absolution 
is possible? The question 
clearly resonates in the 
South African context, but 
Atlantic 2012. 
it is not always clear whether Flanery wants read-
ers to apply his characters' dilemmas to modern 
life more generally. 
The novel's narrative threads are complexly 
interwoven. Ostensibly, professional causes bring 
the protagonists together: Clare, a novelist, has 
reluctantly acceded to have her biography writ-
ten and has chosen Sam, an expatriate academic 
living in the US, for the task. Sam's and Clare's 
first-person narratives in the novel's present are 
sumed dead. Clare wants 
to understand her daughter's actions, which she 
describes as "both too great and selfless as well as 
too dishonorable and horrific to be called heroic" 
(253). Even as she grapples with her inability to 
prevent her daughter's turn to violence, Clare 
seems to envy her clarity of purpose. The sec-
tions drawn from Clare's version of Absolution 
cast her as the victim of a home invasion-a 
common occurrence given the tense racial situ-
ation of contemporary South Africa but also, 
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in Clare's version of events, an act of revenge 
for careless remarks, made decades earlier, that 
may or may not have led to the murder of her 
sister and brother-in-law. As Clare meditates on 
Laura's inarguable guilt-the "dishonorable and 
horrific" guerrilla campaign in which she was 
engaged-she considers her own more question-
able culpability as mother, sister, and novelist 
under apartheid. Unsure how to fix the blame for 
crimes undertaken on behalf of a greater good, 
Clare is also anxious because she does not clearly 
have a crime to which she can confess. "Even if 
Absolution is elusive but 
also desirable, because it can 
retroactively invest one's actions 
with significance. To seek to be 
absolved is to make a claim that 
one has done something. 
the crime is not a crime as such;' she tells her 
son, Mark, "I do and can only regard myself as 
guilty of something like criminal negligence, 
or if not negligence, then recklessness .. :' (287). 
Absolution, these sections suggest, is elusive 
but also desirable, because it can retroactively 
invest one's actions with significance. To seek to 
be absolved, for Clare at least, is to make a claim 
that one has done something, that one is not, as 
she intermittently fears , "[n]othing but a paper 
tiger in a paper cage" (349). 
Sam's sections heighten the narrative's 
suspense by revealing glimpses of his own rela-
tionship with Laura, of which Clare is imperfectly 
aware. They also narrate his awkward reacclima-
tion to life in a country that is less racked by 
violence than in his childhood but still charged 
by an atmosphere of constant danger. Sam's pur-
suit of Clare is both dogged and diffident, and 
the narrative provides little clarity-which Sam 
himself does not seem to possess-about what 
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exactly he wants from her. Dated sections that fill 
in the gaps in Sam's childhood help clarify some 
of the tensions in their relationship, providing 
details of a further connection between Laura 
and Sam's parents, also ANC militants, who died 
during a botched terrorist operation. 
Initially, readers expect Sam to serve as a foil 
for Clare, whose habitual narcissism and tendency 
to evade responsibility establish her unreliability 
as a narrator. But as the novel progresses, Sam's 
status as the diviner of the truth erodes, and he 
ultimately seems, if not disinterested in the truth 
of the past, mistrustful that the truth can bring 
any consolation-or absolution. The complex-
ity of the novel's plot seems designed to amplify 
the question, on which Flanery repeatedly 
focuses, of how the stories we tell ourselves are 
fragile and vulnerable to distortion. Describing 
her Absolution to Sam, Clare classifies it as "a 
weird hybrid of essay and fiction and family and 
national history... both fiction and something 
that is not quite fiction but less than proper his-
tory or memoir" (341). Here, generic hybridity 
functions, as the novel's fractured points of view 
also function, to undermine the ideal of an accu-
rate and full reporting of the past. 
The South African context puts added pres-
sure on the situation: Flanery alludes to and 
provides fictionalized excerpts from reports 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) , that entity charged with suturing the 
past's wounds via their narration. If the TRC's 
work was premised on the assumption that a full 
account of past horrors could serve as an ade-
quate alternative to the more exacting pursuit of 
justice, Absolution questions the ability of story 
to be so faithful to history as to provide libera-
tion from its claims and costs. At the same time, 
Flanery's characters exhibit no post-modern 
playfulness about the truth. Rather, Absolution 
depicts individuals for whom the truth's inac-
cessibility causes an anguish that registers as 
a flattening of self, an inability to grant either 
desire or despair the authority to anchor identity. 
At the center of the characters' lives-and 
at the center of Absolution itself-is therefore a 
kind of nullity. Absent a robust sense of truth, 
notions of responsibility are leached of meaning, 
,----- -------~ -
leaving absolution an absent presence. Hearing 
his mother's confession of her past errors, Mark 
declines to dignify them with the status of 
crimes: "You have overplayed your role in his-
tory, Mother;' he tells her, "and I suggest you do 
nothing else but get over it" (349). Sam gets at the 
crux of the problem when he articulates how his 
life has been shadowed by a notion of accidental 
harm: 
Accidents were always happening. He 
had come from a country of accidents. 
He tried to understand what this meant. 
It seemed to mean that no one was ever 
responsible for anything if only you 
could tell the truth and most of all if you 
could say you were sorry. But he had not 
told the truth and he was not sorry. 
Sam's focus on the accidental echoes Clare's 
description of her own actions as "careless:' For 
these characters, the links between causes and 
effects are not only uncertain but ultimately 
inaccessible. Framed by a theologically resonant 
concept, the struggles of these characters play 
out in a resolutely secular world. Sam and Clare 
cannot imagine making sense of all that has gone 
wrong in their lives by making an appeal beyond 
the contingencies of history. The accidental is 
that for which no one can be blamed, for which 
absolution is beside the point. 
At points, Flanery seems to want to distin-
guish Sam from this economy of the accidental. 
Sam, after all, "had not told the truth and he was 
not sorrY:' One way to understand Sam's flatness 
as a character is to see him as unwilling to forge 
an identity, as Clare does, by glamorizing mis-
takes as crimes. But Sam proves as unable as the 
other characters to pinpoint tragedy's causes by 
applying to the past a richer moral vocabulary. 
If absolution's grace seems inexplicable to these 
characters, so is the notion of evil. Violence past 
and present pervades the novel like a smog, its 
causes beyond pinpointing. Despite his exposure 
of the fiction ofthe accidental, Sam tries to miti-
gate the horror of his parents' violent death for 
his American wife by explaining that "You have 
to understand it in context. It was an accident. It 
wasn't supposed to happen the way it did" (277). 
Without a more nuanced way of understand-
ing the damage people can do to one another, 
Sam is as unable as anyone else to resolve the 
past's ambiguities, or to extend or accept absolu-
tion. The question of how things went so wrong 
for him, for his parents, and for Laura-and 
hence the possibility that those wrongs can be 
repaired-must go unaddressed. 
At the level of plot, this means that the novel's 
climaxes, moments when scraps of truth finally 
emerge, are curiously understated. Readers may 
well find themselves frustrated as the characters 
seem unable to acknowledge the stakes of the 
truths they learn-an inability that ultimately 
feels like an evasion, on the novel's part, of defin-
ing absolution in this starkly-lit, Godless world. 
Flanery has set up his characters' interlocking 
problems cleverly, but Absolution ends by refusing 
to grant the truth, as it has come to be under-
stood, any purchase on the characters' outlook. 
"I am prepared for the biography, when it finally 
appears, to bear no resemblance to the drafts he 
shows me;' Clare muses in conclusion. "I hope 
that will not be so, but as much as I have-almost 
despite myself-come to love him and believe all 
that he tells me . .. I do not trust him, and never 
shall" (386). Unabsolved, ungraced, untrusting, 
Absolution's characters end up much as they 
began: alone with their own ambiguous ver-
sions of the truth. It is not always clear whether 
Flanery wants readers to see their predicament 
as unique to the South African context or part of 
secular culture more generally; the novel's setting 
gives him a fertile ground for raising questions 
about the road from truth to reconciliation, but 
its lingering ambiguities mean that readers may 
not understand how precisely to get from there 
to here. ; 
Joanne Myers is Assistant Professor of 
Engl ish at Gettysburg College. 
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BUILDING 
"The youth gets together his materials 
to build a bridge to the moon .... the 
middle-aged man concludes to build 
a woodshed with them:' 
Thoreau 
These are the planks of our youth. 
We will haul them out. 
Here are the nails we collected in jam jars; 
here the nuts and bolts we bought with pennies. 
Far in the back of closets are the meticulous plans 
sketched in the margins of comic books 
and faded school assignments. 
We will break open the toolbox 
rusted from neglect. 
We will grasp the old weight 
of hammer and saw. 
The earth and sky remember 





Toward a Theology of Zombies 
A. Trevor Sutton 
T
HIS STORY BEGINS LIKE A BAD JOKE: A 
clergyman and three zombie experts walk 
into a room. They are presenting papers 
at an academic conference. After the clergyman 
presents his paper, a graduate student raises her 
hand and asks: "Does the Lutheran faith have 
anything to say about zombies?" 
Through what must have been a cleri-
cal error, I was the lone clergyman on a panel 
of zombie experts at a humanities conference 
hosted by a Midwestern university. Since my 
paper was about early Christian funerary art, the 
conference organizers decided it would be best 
to place me on a panel with three PhD students 
working in the field of zombies. I lectured on the 
dead; they lectured on the undead. 
My fellow panel members addressed some 
vexing zombie issues: Why are Haitian zombies 
confused with filmmaker George Romero's zom-
bies? In a full-fledged zombie apocalypse, is it 
better to hunker down in a basement or ascend 
to the tops of buildings? Can one ever fully 
recover from zombification? These questions-
ostensibly jokes, yet debated with the utmost 
seriousness-filled the allotted presentation 
time and bled into the discussion period. 
As the conversation lingered over the bac-
terial nuances of Haitian zombies, I drifted off 
into my own zombified state of boredom. When 
the discussion had reached undead levels of 
monotony, a question was finally hurled in my 
direction: "Does the Lutheran faith have any-
thing to say about zombies?" 
At first, I was tempted to say that 
Lutheranism has as much to say about zorn-
bies as it does about snipe hunts, unicorns, and 
leprechauns. I resisted. As I thought about the 
question, it became apparent that one thing 
does unite the zombiologists and me: we both 
love a good mystery. For zombiologists, love of 
mystery drives them to speculate tirelessly about 
an impending zombie apocalypse. For me, and 
others in the Lutheran tribe, our love of mystery 
allows us to hold a cornucopia of seemingly par-
adoxical beliefs. 
Although both Lutherans and zombiolo-
gists love mystery, each group handles mystery 
very differently; the very thing that unites these 
groups also divides them. Mystery, for the zorn-
biologists on my panel, is an invitation to probe 
deeper into ontological questions of being. For 
them, a mystery is a problem begging for a solu-
tion. Mystery, for me, is a chance to marvel at 
the miracle of creation. Life's mysteries call for 
reflection, not dissection. 
Zombies, or the notion of embodied 
unconsciousness, can only exist in a world that 
mishandles mysteries. Reductive science, with 
its canine appetite for perfunctory answers, has 
reduced the mystery of creaturely life down to a 
series of mechanical components. If human life 
is but a series of mechanical components, then 
zombie life is what happens when these compo-
nents go awry. 
Take neuroscience as an example: research-
ers have fileted every nook and cranny of the 
brain, with a haughty lot of them declaring that 
creaturely life is merely the result of complex 
operations within the brain. This expectation of 
mastery over mystery is precisely what makes 
zombiologists. 
Zorn biology is an epiphenomenon of reduc-
tive science, a fascination that results from 
imbibing too much Cartesian dualism. If the 
recipe for a human is one part body and one 
part soul, then the recipe for a zombie is merely 
one part body and then substitute flesh-eating 
bacteria for the soul. Zombie lovers, like ghost 
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hunters, are the bastard children of traditional 
Cartesian dualists; while ghost hunters are fix-
ated on the possibility of the bodiless soul, 
zombie lovers are fixated on the possibility of the 
soulless body. 
The desire to master the mystery of life is 
not limited to zombie panels at humanities con-
ferences. The attempt to dissect life down to 
unrecognizable pieces goes beyond human sub-
jects. Our food and animals have been subjected 
to a thorough zombification. Salmon have been 
genetically altered to grow at alarming rates. 
While the zombie-loving 
community may be experts on the 
undead, Christ has made us experts 
on the abundantly-lived life. 
These aptly named "Frankenfish" are almost fish. 
GMO plants can produce sterile seeds so that it 
is almost a soybean. Meat from cattle has been 
infused with some sort of pink slime so that it 
is almost beef. This leads us to wonder: We have 
zombie food, what is to say that we cannot have 
zombie people as well? 
Into the midst of this zombie chaos our 
faith makes some mysterious assertions about 
miraculous things. These declarations some-
times appear impotent. They are dismissed on 
account of the questions they leave unanswered. 
Take for instance the assertion that God formed 
creatures from the dust of the earth. Is this dust 
made of electrons, atoms, or quarks? And what 
exactly is the divine glue used to hold this dust 
together? Is it covalent bonds, quantum physics, 
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or laminin proteins? Our mysterious claim 
leaves these questions unanswered. It simply 
says one thing: Life is from God. 
Another mysterious assertion is that life is 
from the breath of God. This leaves us wonder-
ing: What of the liminal state between breath 
and breathlessness? What do we make of the 
body's electrical signals long after clinical death? 
What of the heart's spontaneous reperfusion 
after being stopped for a time? To these ques-
tions we have only one mysterious claim: Life 
comes from the breath of God. Life is removed 
when the breath of God is removed. 
The mysterious claims of our faith do not 
account for all of the subtleties of reductive sci-
ence. In fact, the mysteries of our faith add a great 
deal of opacity to the conversation. Yet, in these 
simple gems we find something of substance to 
offer the zombie-loving community. While they 
may be experts on the undead, Christ has made 
us experts on the abundantly-lived life. 
Our faith refuses to reduce life down to 
anything less than a miracle. Mysteries are not 
problems. Mysteries are not promptings for fur-
ther inquiry. Instead, mystery is simply a part of 
the creaturely experience. Into a world of chaos 
we carry a handful of mysterious assertions. Our 
claims answer few questions about zombies. Yet, 
somehow the mysteries of our faith answer the 
questions that are worth asking. ~ 
A. Trevor Sutton serves as pastor at St. 
Luke Lutheran Church in Haslett, Michigan. 
His newest book, Creature Life: God's 
Story of Restoration, was co-authored with 
Dr. Charles Arand and is being published 
by Concordia Seminary Press. 
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Theologies of Academic Freedom 
Lake Lambert 
A COMMON NARRATIVE ABOUT HIGHER education in the United States juxtaposes academic freedom and sectarian religious 
identity. As the story is often told, academic free-
dom increases when religious identity diminishes, 
and vice-versa. Indeed, the same story is told by 
those who advocate for greater academic freedom 
and by those who advocate for enhanced religious 
identity. In The Soul of the American University 
(1994), George Marsden bemoaned the fact that 
many church-related colleges and universities 
carelessly abandoned distinctive denominational 
identities for a non-sectarian vision that valued a 
particular version of academic freedom and cul-
tural progress. 
Much happened at the dawn of the twentieth 
century to establish this narrative. As controversies 
raged over historical critical methods of biblical 
study and biological evolution, John Dewey and the 
organization he helped establish-the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP)-
asserted that strong religious or denominational 
identity and academic freedom were antithetical. 
Denominational identity, claimed the AAUP, set 
the religious authority of the church over against the 
scientific authority of the professor. Moreover, the 
sophisticated level of expertise inherent in scientifically-
grounded professorial authority required that any 
evaluation of the teaching and publications of pro-
fessors be made exclusively by peers rather than by 
denominational officials. The canonical form of the 
narrative was eventually established in the AAUP's 
multiple policy documents and the "Red Book" 
that collects them. 
The trouble with a canon, as with all ortho-
doxies, is how it marginalizes alternatives. In 
"The Freedom of Teaching" (1883), the American 
philosopher Josiah Royce offered a different philo-
sophical foundation for academic freedom, arguing 
that the freedom of the educator was necessary 
due to the "disputed problems" higher education 
addressed. While Dewey found the basis of aca-
demic freedom in the expertise and authority of the 
educator, Royce found it in the necessity of doubt 
and continuous investigation in the task oflearning. 
According to Royce, all college- or university-
level teaching engages "disputed questions of prin-
ciple, of method, of scope, and of result;' and as a 
consequence, the professor "must himself be, as 
far as in him lies, an investigator" who encourages 
students to be investigators themselves (237). The 
necessary condition to make this possible is aca-
demic freedom. As Royce states it, "The very air of 
investigation is freedom" (238) . 
Royce was no friend of doctrinaire denomi-
national colleges that made the professor into a 
"mouthpiece" for someone else's ideas. However, 
Royce, by grounding academic freedom in questions 
and doubt as opposed to independent expertise, 
was much more in line with educational methods 
previously embraced by Western Christianity. For 
example, Thomas Aquinas asserted that doubt was 
necessary in the pursuit of truth, and he structured 
the Summa in the scholastic method of disputed 
questions that required readers to engage in alter-
native arguments before truth could be discovered. 
Likewise, the Protestant reformers embraced 
humanism's search for truth by questioning estab-
lished doctrine and returning to original sources. 
The problem, as George Marsden argued, was that 
American higher education in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries embraced a liberal 
Protestantism that endorsed tolerance and non-
sectarianism as theological virtues but did not 
provide a bulwark against arguments like Dewey's 
that valued expertise while marginalizing faith. 
Many serious theologians and denomina-
tional loyalists do not see the choices so starkly 
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as academic freedom versus religious orthodoxy. 
Protestant and Catholic academics can begin with 
different premises but end up in the same place as 
equally forceful advocates for academic freedom 
precisely in colleges and universities that take their 
denominational identities seriously. These fac-
ulty and administrators have crafted theological 
arguments that defend academic freedom against 
denominational leaders outside the university 
Protestant and Catholic academics 
Godsey to defend both, and he did so with argu-
ments that were distinctively Baptist. Writing in 
the student newspaper soon after Roberts's letter 
became public, Godsey sought to define Mercer's 
identity as a Baptist university with an uncompro-
mising support for academic freedom. Godsey also 
made specific connections to Baptist theology and 
especially to the tradition's long commitment to 
religious freedom. While he never explicitly used 
the phrase, Godsey repeatedly alluded 
to what Baptists recognize as "soul 
competency" or "soul freedom;' the theo-
can begin with different premises but end 
up in the same place as equally forceful 
logical idea that "each person's journey 
of faith must be tenaciously respected:' 
Theologically, the concept of soul com-
petency is the Baptist basis for expecting 
personal conversion and limiting bap-
tism exclusively to individuals who 
confess belief. It values the individual and 
freedom of thought, insisting that ideas 
advocates for academic freedom precisely 
in colleges and universities that take their 
denominational identities seriously. 
while answering secular critics for whom academic 
freedom is necessary for respectability. In his book 
Academic Freedom and Christian Scholarship 
(2000), Anthony Diekema, former president of 
Calvin College, contends that the arguments for 
academic freedom are too often based on an epis-
temology of "objectivity and pure rationality" that 
has been largely rejected by the academy itself. 
Instead, all arguments for academic freedom are 
grounded in some type of worldview, and world-
views may differ by institutional mission. Some 
may continue to find their basis in objectivity and 
expertise, but there is not and should not be a sin-
gle universal grounding for academic freedom. 
At my own Mercer University, twenty-five years 
ago academic freedom was tested by charges put 
forward by a Baptist layman in a letter sent to "all 
Georgia Baptists:' Among the many charges made 
by Mr. Lee Roberts of Atlanta were that the teach-
ings and writings of Mercer's president, Dr. Kirby 
Godsey, were heretical and that Mercer University 
Press published works contrary to the teaching 
of the Georgia Baptist Convention. Although the 
charge of heresy was directed at him personally as 
much as it was at the university as a whole, it fell to 
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be engaged without threats of coercion 
and only by the power of the Holy Spirit 
on the human soul. According to Godsey, 
this was the foundation for Mercer's theology of 
academic freedom as well. 
At the University of Notre Dame, issues of aca-
demic freedom emerged in 2006 at the beginning 
of Father John Jenkins's presidency. The impetus 
was three planned events on campus: a Queer Film 
Festival, a performance of The Vagina Monologues, 
and a series of presentations and papers by female 
students on abortion, contraception, and other 
issues in human sexuality that were united under 
the title of "Her Loyal Daughters:' Over several 
months, Father Jenkins and the university as a whole 
articulated a pragmatic yet theological understand-
ing of academic freedom in the Catholic context. 
Academic freedom, said Jenkins in an address to 
the faculty on January 23, 2006, is a "sacred value" 
but one with boundaries nonetheless. He explained 
that his concerns over the three events were "not 
with censorship but with sponsorship:' The issue 
at hand was not the academic freedom of the fac-
ulty or even of individual students but instead the 
appropriateness of academic units and university 
organizations sponsoring certain kinds of events. 
In perfect conformity to AAUP documents, Jenkins 
clearly defended the academic freedom of faculty 
to teach and conduct research subject only to 
peer review as well as their freedom in extramural 
utterances. While Jenkins noted that Notre Dame 
should be open to speakers or events that conflict 
with Catholic values, he cautioned that sponsorship 
of such events by units of the university might cre-
ate the appearance that the university is endorsing 
those views rather than ensuring that a variety of 
views are engaged. 
Four months after Jenkins identified this dis-
tinction between censorship and sponsorship, he 
and department chairs within the College of Arts 
and Sciences issued their "Common Proposal" for 
how potential issues should be resolved, specifically 
invoking the Catholic principle of "subsidiarity" as 
their guide. The principle of subsidiarity has a long 
history in Catholic social thought; it claims that 
decisions should be made at the lowest level possible 
in societies and even in organizations. In this case, 
Father Jenkins and the chairs proposed that within 
the university "departments are best situated to 
decide what events should and should not be spon-
sored and to explain the nature of the sponsorship" 
and that "the President should rarely be involved 
in such day-to-day matters:' The statement repeat-
edly mentions the need for Catholic teachings and 
perspectives to be part of the ongoing dialogue at 
the university as well as the final authority of the 
president in all matters. Through its invocation of 
subsidiarity, Notre Dame was able to align itself 
with the AAUP standard of disciplinary experts 
being the primary decision-makers over what ideas 
should and should not be publicly presented at the 
university, while at the same time invoking a long-
respected principle of Catholic teaching. 
Unlike Mercer and Notre Dame, California 
Lutheran University ( CLU) did not articulate its 
understanding of academic freedom in response 
to an issue or concern but took a more proactive 
approach through the work of a presidentially-
appointed committee seeking to define the 
institution's denominational identity. In a com-
mittee document with a title borrowed from the 
university's motto-"Love of Christ, Truth and 
Freedom: The Lutheran Character of California 
Lutheran University" -the committee asserted that 
"Love of Truth" requires a vigorous defense of aca-
demic freedom as well as a commitment to promote 
both theological literacy and to provide occasions 
for an encounter with the Christian Gospel. After 
describing Martin Luther's identity as a university 
professor, the statement adds that "neither Luther 
nor the tradition he inspired fear challenge, debate, 
or diversity of views. These simply magnify the 
complexity of the Creation and further glorify the 
Creator:' There is also remarkable consistency in 
the university's documents relating to academic 
freedom, including a guide for new faculty and 
staff stating that "the university supports academic 
inquiry and a scholarly quest for truth in all disci-
plines, believing that scientific inquiry and insights 
of faith are complementary ways of pursuing the 
wholeness of truth:' Even the university's faculty 
handbook begins with Lutheran theology before 
moving into a direct quotation from the 1940 
AAUP statement on academic freedom and tenure. 
Theologies of academic freedom tell us some-
thing about the identities of faith-based colleges 
and universities as they seek to uphold the values 
of both academy and the church. For the academy, 
institutional support for academic values creates 
legitimacy and aids faculty recruitment and reten-
tion, and for the church, institutional support for 
theological ideals also creates legitimacy and may 
aid ongoing church support in funding and enroll-
ment. Attacks against academic freedom from 
inside denominational circles require responses 
from shared denominational sources of author-
ity. Colleges and universities that seek to renew 
their denominational identities must provide a 
theological accounting for how a denomination's 
theology is compatible with academic values like 
academic freedom. Finally, academic freedom can 
have diverse sources, theological as well as secular, 
allowing many faith-based institutions to preserve 
their identities while upholding one of the most 
important and widely shared scholarly values. 
Church-related higher education would benefit 
from more theologies of academic freedom. These 
theologies would mine the depths of denomina-
tional traditions as well as the traditions within 
traditions that established and maintained colleges 
and universities for over a century. Hauge Lutherans 
may have something different to say than Loehe 
Lutherans or "happy Dane" Lutherans. Likewise, 
Holy Cross Catholics may have something different 
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to say than Franciscans or Dominicans. Even 
Baptists at Mercer call themselves "Mercer Baptists" 
to distinguish themselves from others and to tie 
ourselves back to our namesake Jesse Mercer who 
was a passionate advocate for religious freedom and 
who even wrote the religious freedom clause of the 
Georgia Constitution. Most importantly, theolo-
gies of academic freedom will allow church-related 
colleges and universities to embrace this highest of 
academic values because of their denominational 
traditions rather than in spite of them, making the 
traditions alive and more meaningful to the aca-
demic vocations of teachers and students. t 
Lake Lambert is Dean of the College of 
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THIN PLACES 
"Thin places are ... where the veil 
momentarily lifts, and we behold God." 
-· --- - ·- ... . -
Marcus Borg, The Heart of Christianity 
In the slim space between the body 
of the i and its dot, between any 
letter and a comma, between the two 
ts in little, between the e and a in beauty 
itself, is almost God, almost Word-not 
quite, but some place sheer enough 
to spell us for a while until the merest 
places close down on sin to suggest 
a single sentence, simple prose, 
spare and lucid as "Let there be light:' 
Mary M. Brown 
religion -
Insecurity 
Thomas C. Willadsen 
I 
KNEW AT 11:30 THIS MORNING THAT I WOULD 
not get anything done today. This is the earliest 
I have ever made such a designation. Usually 
it dawns on me at about 4:00 in the afternoon 
that my day has been completely unproductive. 
After more than twenty years in ministry, I know 
when I need to give myself a "fallow day;' put 
my responsibility addiction on hold, lower my 
expectations, and muddle through. 
My day started at 3:45 AM . The Voice from 
the church's insecurity system phoned me about 
an intruder at church. The police had been called. 
"How soon can you get there, and what will you 
be driving?" 
"Ten minutes. A red Prius." 
We've had the insecurity system for twelve 
years. For some reason our insurance company 
required that we get it when we installed the 
elevator. So far it has never alerted us to a fire 
or burglary. It has alerted us to malfunctioning 
smoke detectors and staff members who have left 
the building after the system has armed itself for 
the night. Once I was phoned at 1 AM because a 
smoke detector was sending an error message. I 
thanked the Voice for waking me and went back 
to sleep. The Voice phoned again. "The Oshkosh 
Fire Department has been called because the 
northeast stairwell fire detector has gone off:' 
"What am I missing?" I asked. I assumed the 
sensor was broken, but if it was not, and there 
really was a fire, I figured I could drive past the 
smoldering ruins at first light. 
"They asked that you be there:' 
At this point I'm wondering, "Do they need 
me to say, 'I'm Pastor Willadsen and I approve 
your fighting this fire'?" 
I pulled on my sweatpants and met the fire 
fighters, and we confirmed that the smoke detec-
tor was on the fritz. I returned home. Monday we 
called the smoke detector people. I asked, "Could 
you make these things malfunction at 10 AM on 
a weekday?" 
"You pay extra for that:' 
Last Wednesday, our choir director stayed 
late after rehearsal to file some music. She left the 
building after the system armed, and the Voice 
called to inform me, "There has been a breach at 
the East Door:' This did not sound serious, but it 
did sound rather personal. I walked through the 
building, and turned off four lights that different 
groups had left on. I went to the East Door and 
found two of Oshkosh's finest there. Luckily, they 
did not open fire when I walked out. And they 
took me at my word when I said unto them, "''m 
the pastor." I was home in fifteen minutes and 
rested comfortably the rest of the evening. 
The police department used to tug on the 
church doors to see whether they were locked 
as part of their regular duties. Once one of them 
pulled a little too hard and made the system think 
the door had been opened. The Voice called me 
about a possible intruder. I met the officer. His 
build reflected his occupation's legendary fond-
ness for donuts. He insisted that I walk through 
the building with him looking for the intruder. 
We walked through the basement. We walked 
through the main floor. We walked through the 
second floor. When we were nearly done, I said, 
"You know where I'd hide if I were an intruder? 
The bell tower! Let's go up there!" The bell tower 
is at the top of a steep twenty-step spiral stair-
case. "No one up here? Go figure! Thanks for 
checking this out with me!" Officer Cruller was 
winded and wet with sweat after ascending the 
staircase. He never tugged on the doors again. 
This morning was different. There were three 
police cars on the street when I arrived. The glass 
back door of the church had been shattered. The 
door was ajar; it could not close because of all 
the broken glass in the jamb. While they were 
deciding whether to enter the building to look 
for an intruder, another officer radioed that he 
had found some bloody sweatpants on the front 
yard of the church. I walked down one side of the 
building and found an officer on the corner hold-
ing a rifle. I retreated to another corner of the 
property when the officer suggested I wait in my 
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car. My church was a crime scene around which 
they formed a perimeter. I watched from the car 
as the torches of four officers flashed throughout 
the building. 
About that time, I spotted a young woman 
sitting on the curb across the street. At first she 
was screaming; then she turned docile. A few 
minutes later, an officer downgraded her condi-
tion to "remorseful." I do not know whether they 
took her to the hospital or the pokey. One of the 
perimeter officers informed me that I could enter 
the building. I reset the insecurity system. I went 
to my office and got the cellphone number of our 
property guy. I swept enough glass off the jamb 
so the door could latch. I returned home at about 
5 AM, but didn't exactly sleep. 
At 7 AM I called the property guy. Then I 
called the secretary, the preschool teacher, and 
the custodian. By 8 AM a new door had been 
ordered, and the glass had been cleaned up. By 
3 in the afternoon we had a new door. Insurance 
will cover it, and the church will probably even 
get its deductible back as restitution, the police 
suggested. 
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At 8:30PM I was sitting in a restaurant twenty 
miles from home, meeting a colleague for break-
fast as I do each month. I drank too much coffee. 
We talked about all the things that seminary 
never prepared us for. Things like insecurity sys-
tems, SWAT teams, random acts of vandalism, 
and the reality that some days you are simply not 
going to get anything done, besides musing on 
the plight of not getting anything done. I ate sup-
per with our after-school group. I talked to one 
of the classes about communion. I headed home 
at the usual time for a Wednesday, more than fif-
teen hours after my day began. 
And so to bed. ~ 
The Rev. Thomas C. Willadsen is pastor 
of First Presbyterian Church in Oshkosh, 
Wisconsin. 
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The Election Issue That Wasn't 
But Shou ld Have Been 
Geoffrey C. Bowden 
T
HAT THERE WAS NO SERIOUS DISCUSSION 
of our well-known, but secret, drone war 
in the Middle East and Africa during the 
Presidential election of 2012 was both mysteri-
ous and depressing. If the United States is indeed 
actively engaged in the practice of flying un-
manned aerial drones over countries toward 
which we are not openly hostile and launching 
missiles at unsuspecting people on the ground, 
then this seems like something we should talk 
about, especially when we are in the process of 
attempting to decide who to give the power to do 
such a thing. 
This is how the drone war appears to oper-
ate: The president and a team of advisors 
regularly meet to discuss the "kill list" (on "Terror 
Tuesday") which is the climax of a process that 
seems to begin with a "disposition matrix;' a 
futuristic term used to describe an assessment 
tool that determines the extent to which a person 
is a terrorist threat and how best to deal with that 
person (Miller 2012). If someone is unfortunate 
enough to land on the kill list, normally the CIA 
will use its local "assets" in proximity to the per-
son to "tag" a car or dwelling used by the "target" 
with a GPS device, at which point a drone will 
locate the GPS signal, fly within range, and fire 
a missile at whatever the GPS device is tagged to 
(Smith 2012). 
It seems like a misnomer to call this a "war;' 
since it more closely resembles an assassination. 
However, when these actions are done at the fre-
quency we are doing it, the term "war" becomes 
apt. And the term "assassination" implies a sur-
gical strike that limits damage to the intended 
target, but reports indicate that this is hardly 
the case with drone attacks. Hundreds of civil-
ians have been killed in Pakistan alone, including 
176 children (Ponnuru 2012). Alarmingly, the 
President's justification for these civilian deaths 
is that he "in effect counts all military-age males 
in a strike zone as combatants ... unless there is 
explicit intelligence posthumously proving them 
innocent" (cited in Ponnuru). So if you are of 
a certain age that we normally associate with 
Islamic terrorists and happen to be in the drone's 
"strike zone;' you are an enemy-combatant of the 
United States regardless of whether you intended 
to do the United States harm or not. Guilty until 
we can prove you innocent, after we have killed 
you. The moral of the story: be very careful with 
whom you hang out in the Middle East. 
Why didn't the drone war ever emerge as 
a political issue in the presidential election of 
2012? Surely this was a vulnerability for President 
Obama, who made serious political hay in 2008 
by criticizing the Bush administration's prosecu-
tion of the War in Iraq as immoral and potentially 
illegal. For Obama then to prosecute his own war, 
though one of a vastly different variety, with little 
or no constitutional/legal framework for doing 
so would seem to make him open to criticism on 
both moral and legal grounds, not to mention 
grounds of hypocrisy. The first and most obvious 
answer is that President Obama and Governor 
Romney did not differ much on the use of drones. 
When Romney was asked about the use of drones 
in one of the debates, he responded "I support 
that entirely and feel the president was right to 
up the usage of that technology and believe that 
we should continue to use it to continue to go 
after the people who represent a threat to this 
nation and to our friends" (quoted in Ponnuru). 
Neither candidate desires to appear passive in the 
age of global terrorism, and what better way to 
destroy that appearance than to fire missiles at 
"threats" every so often? Second, presidents and 
potential presidents desire one thing: power. It 
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never fails. No matter how much they campaign 
on restraining the power of the executive, on 
waging a "humble foreign policy" (Bush in 2000), 
or on curbing past executive excesses (Obama in 
2008 on closing Gitmo), presidents and potential 
presidents who understand the nature of the job 
always keep open possible methods of increasing 
the power of the office. To make the drone war 
an issue in the election is to put a spotlight on it, 
drawing public, moral, and legal scrutiny that can 
only lead to restrictions. Apparently the Obama 
administration has been making moves toward 
erecting a moral and legal framework around the 
drone war to restrict the power of future execu-
tives, but only time will tell if this framework will 
have real teeth (Stableford 2012). 
Perhaps a deeper answer is in order, how-
ever. The fact that the drone war and the War 
in Afghanistan were essentially non-issues in 
this election reveals a nation that is war-weary 
and has little patience for complicated and 
emotionally-draining debates over the ethics of 
war. There is a deep fissure in America's collec-
tive mindset about war. Yes, we have been at war 
for over a decade now, with a heavy ground pres-
ence in two countries, and many American men 
and women have died, not to mention many non-
Americans. War-weariness results from seeing 
people lose their lives in a conflict that seems to 
be going nowhere, with no achievable and wor-
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thy objective in sight, but this war-weariness 
pertains only to real conflicts, to actual "boots-
on-the-ground" wars where we invest money 
and man-power in this tragic and ancient prac-
tice. Our weariness does not extend to the idea of 
war. In fact, it is not a stretch at all to suggest that 
American society and culture, guided by a political 
culture with plenty of incentives to wage war, has 
made peace with the idea of war, the idea of killing 
others to achieve our goals on a global scale. We 
will wage war if it is in our national interest to do 
so, and maybe only if it 
is in our national inter-
est to do so. So-called 
"humanitarian wars" or 
wars waged to spread 
democracy to oppressed 
peoples do not sit quite 
as well with Americans, 
especially if we are 
going to see our own die 
in the process. But the 
idea of war, well, we can 
generally see the merits 
of that. 
There is a difference 
between Americans 
being comfortable with 
war as a hypothetical 
and Americans being at peace with this or that 
particular war where their sons and daughters 
are doing the fighting . But if we can come to grips 
with the ethics of "war-in-general;' we should 
do so only through the particular wars that we 
fight. Pragmatic necessity spurs philosophic 
inquiry. Over time, when we perceive the neces-
sity of fighting this or that war and agree that it is 
acceptable to ask our young people to fight those 
wars, then we ascend to a notion that war can be 
morally acceptable and even obligatory at times: 
we develop a "theory of war." The experiences of 
particular wars trigger a process of moral delib-
eration through which we forge a position on the 
morality of war in general. But herein lies the 
difference with the drone war: Americans never 
experience it. We have no skin in the game, as 
it were. What forces us to consider the ethics 
of a particular war is that we have to make the 
enormous decision about whether we should sac-
rifice some of our own people or money for this 
cause. With the drone war, that decision never 
enters the equation. The drones are un-manned, 
controlled remotely from sites in the United 
States. And a drone attack is relatively inexpen-
sive, especially when compared to a large ground 
invasion. So, why would Americans ever expend 
the mental energy to think about whether drone 
attacks are morally acceptable or legal? Drone 
wars do not trigger moral thinking about war; 
we have no reason to think about "particular 
instances" in the drone war, because we do not 
experience the loss of human-capital or money. 
It is possible that at some point in the future 
Americans will engage in a vigorous public 
debate about the ethics of using un-manned 
aerial drones to assassinate enemies or poten-
tial enemies, but we clearly have not reached 
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SLIVERS 
I recognize us running freely effortlessly 
my brother and I alone, one chasing 
the other in the overgrown empty lot 
next to our childhood Michigan home. 
I can see hastening feet blur as we bolt 
between skeletal deprived bushes the height 
and breadth of children our age-at the time 
imagined foes. Unable to discern faces 
I instead recollect shared laughter, the dry 
salty taste of open-mouthed breathing, breath short 
because we were too young to breathe any 
deeper. Separated by just under a year, we 
hadn't yet the capacity to fully remember-
images flash only long enough for slivers 
of light to appear in the time of idle darkness, 
jagged fragments illuminating the measured space 
surrounding the frame of a cracked bedroom 
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The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism Revisited 
or Pride Gaeth Before a Fall 
H. David Baer 
T
WENTY-ONE YEARS AGO THE SOVIET UNION 
collapsed, marking the end of an era. After 
forty-five years of the Cold War, liberal 
democracy had emerged triumphant. Developing 
nations across the world looked to the United States 
and Western Europe for models of success. Francis 
Fukuyama wrote a book titled The End of History, 
in which he argued that Western-style liberal 
democracy represented the end point of political 
evolution; Michael Novak republished The Spirit of 
Democratic Capitalism, in which he defended the 
superiority of free markets to planned economies. 
Today, however, the West is in crisis. In the 
United States, the securitization of mortgages 
within a highly opaque and poorly regulated 
financial sector led in 2007 to a massive market 
failure and the greatest economic crisis since the 
Great Depression. In Europe, structural defects 
with the common currency coupled to high lev-
els of sovereign debt have pushed some nations 
into deep recession, threatening Europe's political 
integration and stability. When developing coun-
tries search for models of success, rather than 
look to the West, they often look to China, with 
its undemocratic, state-sponsored capitalism. The 
ability of free markets to outperform all com-
petitors can no longer be taken for granted; the 
superiority of democratic capitalism is no longer 
self-evident. What went wrong? 
The answer to that question is multifaceted, 
but underlying every facet of the answer may be 
a truth first discerned by Solomon, "Pride goeth 
before destruction, and a haughty spirit before 
a fall." The United States has been the world's 
unchallenged economic and military superpower 
for twenty years, and unrivaled supremacy makes 
for complacency. "See, see but do not perceive;' 
writes the prophet; "make the heart of this people 
fat:' A fat-hearted people, concerned with comfort 
and privilege, refuses to notice signs of impending 
crisis until after it comes. In America, the failures 
of our domestic politics are only now becoming 
apparent. 
We now know, for example, that the finan-
cial sector was not functioning anywhere near as 
well as the free marketers told us. In her recent 
book Bull by the Horns (Free Press, 2012), Former 
FDIC chair Sheila Bair describes the way "deregu-
latory dogma'' deluded Washington elites, both 
Republican and Democrat, into believing that 
markets and institutions could regulate them-
selves. As she explains: 
The groupthink was that technologi-
cal innovation, coupled with the Fed's 
seeming mastery of maintaining an easy 
monetary policy without inflation, meant 
an end to the economic cycles of good 
times and bad that had characterized our 
financial system in the past. The golden 
age of banking was here and would last 
forever. We didn't need regulation any-
more. (Bair 17) 
Momentous financial crises, like those we experi-
enced in 2007 and 2008, just weren't supposed to 
happen anymore. Called to testify before Congress 
in 2008, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, whose commitment to the idea of 
the self-correcting free market was frequently 
described as ideological, could only express his 
"shocked disbelief" that financial institutions had 
failed to monitor themselves, and then reluctantly 
acknowledged a "flaw" in his system of thought. 
However, to attribute the cause of our present 
discontents to the financial sector alone would 
be too easy; "Does a bird fall in a snare when 
there is no trap for it?" Over the course of the 
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last two decades, Americans have fallen prey to 
a bowdlerized version of free-market philosophy, 
according to which markets produce prosperity 
automatically, and no one ever has to sacrifice 
or attend to the health of civil society. Perhaps 
nowhere is this self-deception more striking than 
in our tax code, riddled through and through 
with exemptions, deductions, credits, and loop-
holes. Although the inefficiency of the tax code 
is universally acknowledged, its inequity is some-
Over the course of the last two 
decades, Americans have fallen 
prey to a bowdlerized version of 
free-market philosophy, according 
to which markets produce 
prosperity automatically, and no 
one ever has to sacrifice or attend 
to the health of civil society. 
times overlooked. Every tax exemption is a form 
of government subsidy. The popular mortgage-
interest deduction, for example, costs the federal 
government four times as much in lost revenue as 
the amount it spends directly on public housing 
for America's poorest quintile (see The Economist, 
"America's Tax System;' October 13, 2012). But 
because this subsidy is hidden in the tax code, its 
middle- and upper-class beneficiaries can extol 
the virtues of the free market without ever notic-
ing their own hypocrisy. For a moment, such 
hypocritical self-deception was rudely exposed 
by Mitt Romney's infamous reference to the 47 
percent, not only-as was quickly pointed out in 
the press-because a large percentage of the 47 
percent are Republicans, but also-as was not 
much noted-because the wealthy donors whom 
Romney addressed, deducting their mortgage 
interest and health insurance premiums from 
their taxes paid on investment income at a lower 
52 The Cresset 
rate than wage earners, are themselves enormous 
beneficiaries of government largesse. What is this, 
if not "to falsify the balances with deceit"? 
Self-serving appeals to a free-market phi-
losophy preached but never practiced have also 
blinded Americans to the problem of growing 
income inequality. In the mid-twentieth century, 
economists used to argue that while inequality 
increases in the early stages of industrialization, it 
decreases as economies develop. Today, we know 
that this is not necessarily the case. Since 1980, 
the share of national income in the United States 
going to the top 1 percent has doubled from 10 
percent to 20 percent; the share going to the rich-
est .01 percent has jumped from 1 percent to 5 
percent. Judged by a standard measure called 
the Gini coefficient, the level of inequality in the 
United States is starting to move uncomfortably 
close to that of a South American country like 
Brazil. Although economists used to believe that 
a growing economy benefits everyone, the evi-
dence now suggests that those on the bottom and 
middle end of the income distribution are falling 
behind in absolute, not just relative terms. Wage 
income is stagnating (see The Economist, "World 
Economy, For Richer, for Poorer;' October 13, 
2012). Whatever the moral issues, economists are 
telling us in increasing number that large dispari-
ties in wealth pose an economic problem. Joseph 
Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World 
Bank and winner of the Nobel Prize, argues in 
The Price of Inequality (W W Norton, 2012), that 
large inequalities render an economy inefficient 
and unstable. Summarizing his views, Stiglitz 
writes: 
Inequality weakens aggregate demand, 
because those at the middle and bottom 
have to spend all or almost all of what 
that they get, while those at the top don't. 
The concentration of wealth in recent 
decades led to bubbles and instability, as 
the Fed tried to offset the effects of weak 
demand arising from our inequality by 
low interest rates and lax regulation .... 
Mainstream economic institutions like the 
International Monetary Fund now recog-
nize the connection between inequality 
and a weak economy. (New York Times, 
October 26, 2012) 
Moreover, growing income inequality in 
America appears to be a symptom of diminish-
ing equality of opportunity. Economists seeking 
to measure the extent to which the income of 
parents influences the income and educational 
attainment of children have developed something 
called the "inter-generational elasticity of income" 
coefficient. According to this measure, parental 
income explains half of the differences in chil-
dren's outcomes in the US, which is worse than in 
virtually every country in Europe, including much 
maligned socialist Sweden (see, The Economist, 
"Economic Opportunity;' October 13, 2012) . Nor 
can one attribute inequality in America simply to 
the workings of the market. American inequality 
is exacerbated by a skewed but invisible welfare 
state, one that distributes wealth upward by means 
of a Byzantine tax code and redistributes wealth 
from the young to the old through a system of 
entitlements. 
Severe inequality, if left uncorrected, can lead 
to political crises. To be sure, some inequality is 
unavoidable, but if too much of a nation's wealth 
ends up in the hands of the few, a country becomes 
divided into factions with conflicting and irrecon-
cilable interests. Such societies cannot discern a 
common good and may cease to cohere. Ancient 
Rome was wracked by civil wars caused by plebian 
resentment of aristocratic privileges, which gave 
rise to dictators and the end of the Republic. The 
twentieth century was tormented by left and right-
wing totalitarianisms originating in reactions to 
social failures caused by earlier forms of capital-
ism. US history also knows its social upheavals 
and dangerous forms of populism. 
These are truths we have forgotten, lulled 
into a sense of security by our self-congratulatory 
faith in the inevitability of history. History, how-
ever, records failure as well as success. It tells the 
tale of nations that declined and fell after failing 
to meet the challenges which confronted them. 
Only a stiff-necked people would believe its own 
history is destined to be different. Democracy 
doesn't happen; it is built and tended to. Its suc-
cess depends on effort and honesty and qualities 
of character which, surveying the political land-
scape, would appear in short supply. If the heart 
of the people is fat, no government of the people, 
by the people, and for the people can hope long to 
prosper. For democracy in America, a new birth 
of freedom may depend upon a change of heart. f 
H. David Baer is Associate Professor of 
Theology and Philosophy at Texas Lutheran 
University. 
Advent/Christmas 2012 53 
54 The Cresset 
DURING EXODUS 
A goldfinch hit the window 
During that part in Exodus 
(Your child was reading it to us) 
About the years of manna. 
I looked for where it came from, 
The thump, not knowing what it was, 
And there it was on the grass, 
Plump at my foot, ruffling some, 
And there I saw its story. 
Beside it, another, cold, 
A tail tipped yellow, not gold, 
White frost circling its eye, 
Hoary as manna I imagine: 
Brother, worth keeping; 
Feather, not ruffling; 
An eye without light's leaven. 
I bent down to see if the other, 
The one that made the thump, was hurt. 
It flew before my touch, alert 
Not for salt; something brighter, colder. 
Steven Walters 
Reviewed in this issue ... 
Elaine Pagels's Revelations 
REVELATIONS: VISIONS, PROPHECY, AND Politics in the Book of Revelation offers a new look at the Book of Revelation from 
the perspective of Elaine Pagels, best known for 
her work with the Nag Hammadi Library-the 
collection of so-called "Gnostic Gospels:' The 
Gnostic Gospels are a series of codices (little 
books) found in Egypt in 1945, dated from the 
third and fourth cen-
turies. These texts are 
called "Gnostic" par-
tially for their hidden 
spiritual meaning, or 
gnosis, but also after 
the sect that gave 




ing Irenaeus and 
Tertullian attacked 
the Gnostic move-
ment, branding it 
heretical because its 
adherents expressed 
views at odds with the acceptable doctrines of the 
Christian Church. 
If you do not own a translation of the 
Gnostic Gospels and have always been curi-
ous about them, Revelations is an easy way to 
gain some exposure. The book takes a polemical 
tone describing how religious authorities have 
used the Book of Revelation as a tool to thwart 
the Gnostic movement since it first emerged. 
Pagels, in fact, questions whether the book ever 
should have been included in the Bible at all and 
states that it was not the product of an Apostle. 
She posits that the defenders of early Christian 
orthodoxy invented the idea that John, the 
beloved disciple of Jesus and witness to the cru-
cifixion and resurrection, wrote the Apocalypse. 
She holds that the real author was another John, a 
frustrated Jewish prophet/writer of no reputation 
who, shortly after the Roman war, was bent on 
lashing out at the Romans and Gentile converts 
REVELATIONS: 
VISIONS, PROPHECY AND 
POLITICS IN THE BooK 
OF REVELATION 
Elaine Pagels 




Don W. Davis 
of Paul of Tarsus. 
If you are a 
little rusty on your 
church history, 
Revelations will 
either confuse or 
delight, depending 
on your orientation 
to and apprecia-
tion for traditional 
Christian thought. 
The Church con-
siders the Gnostic 
Gospels apocryphal 
(of doubtful au then-
ticity) since they are 
pseudepigraphical 
(ascribed to authors who did not actually write 
them). Pagels asserts that defenders of orthodoxy 
had political reasons for stomping out the Gnostic 
cause, but fails to mention the real reasons why they 
did so. The early Church rejected Gnostic views 
not so much because the early Church Fathers 
were rigid about establishing orthodoxy (although 
they certainly were), but because the Gnostics did 
not believe in Jesus' divinity or physical resur-
rection. Gnostic writings of the third and fourth 
centuries were frowned upon because they did 
not meet the minimum requirement of apostolic 
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authority and authorship and also because they 
contradicted other works (biblical ones) that did. 
Bear in mind as you read Pagels's book, when she 
says Revelation(s), she means the Gnostic ones and 
when she says Revelation (no s), she means the 
biblical one. In an effort to put Revelations on par 
with Revelation and to level the playing field for 
the Gnostics, she challenges the Revelation in two 
ways: 1) She calls into doubt the book's apostolic 
authorship, and; 2) She criticizes its inclusion in 
the New Testament canon. 
Most scholars, including Pagels, believe that 
the Book of Revelation was written around 95 AD 
near the time of the Roman Emperor Domitian's 
death. She tells a story of how her John turns up 
in Ephesus to distribute his book of propaganda 
after a brief exile on the Isle ofPatmos. Once back 
on the mainland, John of Patmos goes to work 
sending his prophecy to the seven churches in 
Asia Minor, namely Ephesus, Smyrna, Thyatira, 
Laodicea, Pergamon, Sardis, and Philadelphia. 
This story is not unlike the traditional ver-
sion featuring John the Apostle. He too was 
exiled to Patmos and at the death of Domitian 
returned to Ephesus, where the Christian Church 
had re-established itself after being driven from 
Jerusalem. The seven churches were all in a cir-
cular route from Ephesus, relatively near one 
another. Christians believe John the Apostle 
started these churches himself and was regarded 
with reverence and affection by their bishops. 
They believe this because the Book of Revelation 
was read in those churches immediately after it 
was circulated, and there exists testimony from 
some of the bishops of those churches as early as 
the beginning of the second century. It is difficult 
to imagine Pagels's John of Patmos, furious with 
Rome and Gentile converts, gaining traction in 
the seven churches. Since they knew nothing of 
him and his prophecies, it is more likely he would 
have offended their congregations than delighted 
them. A sweep of all seven is hard to fathom. 
It is not so hard, on the other hand, to imagine 
the Apostle gaining immediate traction in those 
churches led by bishops he had put into place 
before his exile. 
At four different places, the Book of 
Revelation claims to be written by "John." The 
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author speaks with authority in chapters two 
and three to the bishops of the seven churches, 
starting with Ephesus. The author has thorough 
knowledge of what is going on in each of these 
churches as he comments on their strengths and 
weaknesses in minute detail. That this John was 
the famous Apostle comes from an early, reli-
able source-Irenaeus, who was a native of Asia 
Minor living near Smyrna where Polycarp, one of 
the three principal Apostolic Fathers, was bishop. 
Polycarp converted to Christianity by means of 
direct interaction with the apostles of Christ. He 
personally knew and communicated with many 
who had seen and heard Jesus. Polycarp knew 
John the Apostle, according to Irenaeus who 
called Polycarp a disciple of the Apostle. Irenaeus 
did not know the Apostle, but did know Polycarp. 
Irenaeus quotes from the Revelation again and 
again in his works as the product of the Apostle. 
An Ephesian contemporary of Polycarp, 
Papias, attests to the book's inspiration, which 
implies that he knew it was apostolic. In one of 
the fragments of his works, Papias seems to refer 
to two distinct and separate Johns in Ephesus at 
the time: 
I would inquire for the sayings of the 
Presbyters, what Andrew said, or what 
Peter said, or what Philip or what Thomas 
or James or what John or Matthew or 
any other of the Lord's disciples, and for 
the things which other of the Lord's dis-
ciples, and for the things which Aristion 
and the Presbyter John, the disciples of 
the Lord, were saying. 
The possible reference to a second John in this 
fragment is where the conspiracy theories of 
another John originate, theories that Pagels takes 
to a whole new level. The fact that there are two 
separate tombs in Ephesus bearing the name of 
John adds fuel to the fire, but a careful reading of 
the fragment is not definitive. Papias could have 
been referring to the same John in two different 
ways and, regardless of the rendering, he did not 
attribute authorship to either. No one made much 
of this until the fourth century when writers were 
looking for ways to soften the Christian message 
after the Romans legalized the religion under 
Constantine. 
Pagels contends that the earliest testimo-
nies of apostolic authorship were manufactured. 
She accuses Irenaeus and Justin Martyr of mak-
ing the whole thing up: "when critics charged 
that a heretic had written it, its earliest defend-
ers sought to lend it legitimacy by insisting that 
Jesus' own disciple John wrote its prophesies" (2). 
It is particularly distasteful that she would accuse 
the early Church Fathers of making up apostolic 
authorship when she herself offers no evidence 
whatsoever that any such John of Patmos ever 
lived. 
Pagels also tells us that the early Christians 
panned the book and few ever paid attention to it. 
She writes: "Ever since it was written, Christians 
have argued for and against it especially from 
the second century to the fourth, when it barely 
squeezed into the canon to become the final 
book of the New Testament" (2). Again, the facts 
seem to point in the opposite direction. There 
were very few, mostly anonymous, detractors 
of the book until 247 AD, when Dionysius of 
Alexandria built a case that the Apostle could not 
have written it. Dionysius noted what he believed 
were stylistic differences between the Book of 
Revelation and the Gospel of John and John's 
Epistles. He felt it odd that John mentioned his 
own name in the Revelation, whereas he never 
did so in the other works of his hand. Scholars 
since have debated the stylistic differences, which 
do seem to exist, but the most obvious answer for 
this is that John wrote down the vision exactly 
as it unfolded on Patmos. Pagels believes, rather, 
that John of Patmos contrived the book for polit-
ical reasons and that the style he used ("wartime 
literature" she calls it) was a method intended 
to put forward certain coded, political messages 
(7). Dionysius himself believed the work to be 
inspired, as Pagels notes, but not authored by the 
Apostle. 
Perhaps Dionysius did not give enough 
weight to the fact that the author was exiled to the 
Roman mines under guard and saw these visions 
in a cave, probably without much scribal help to 
record them. In Ephesus, where the Christian 
church hierarchy had transferred many resources 
from Jerusalem after the war, there was a cadre of 
Greek writers and scribes that could have worked 
with the text once it was in their care, but exiled 
on Patmos John was on his own with at most 
one scribe to assist him. Since he was told in the 
vision to write down exactly what he saw (Rev. 
1:19, 22:18,19), he may have insisted that changes 
not be made to the raw text upon his return to 
Ephesus. Perhaps Dionysius should have excused 
the fact that John's Greek was not smoothed out 
The objections raised in regard to 
the apostolic authorship of the Book 
of Revelation are thin, late, and 
subjective. They were made long 
after the fact and far removed from 
the region where the author lived 
and the work was disseminated. 
for that reason and acknowledged that he chose 
to drop the self-deprecating practice of omitting 
his name from his own work because this was 
not his own work, but rather Jesus' own revela-
tion. John likely identified himself because the 
emperor had banished him from the land of the 
living and was unsure as to whether he would sur-
vive. His job-as he probably saw it-was to get 
the vision out to the seven churches at all cost. In 
the case of his untimely demise, it would be more 
readily accepted if it bore the Apostle's name. He 
calls himself John because he is the Apostle writ-
ing to his own flock. He does not need to identify 
himself further. 
Another source for Pagels is Eusebius, who 
in the fourth century picked up on the refer-
ence to two Johns of Papias to put forward a 
theory that Presbyter John may have actually 
penned the Book of Revelation, rather than 
the famous Apostle. Even Eusebius wavers and 
at times implies that the book is apostolic. It 
is conceivable that Eusebius, in his efforts to 
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present the history of Christianity at the onset of 
the Imperial Church in the best light, was simply 
walking back the harshness of the Apocalypse in 
its apparent allusions to Rome. 
A reasonable conclusion to the objections 
raised in regard to the apostolic authorship of the 
Book of Revelation by the time of Dionysius and 
Eusebius must be that they are thin, late, and sub-
jective. They were made long after the fact and far 
removed from the region where the author lived 
and the work was disseminated. The evidence for 
the Apostle having written it on the other hand, 
is strong, objective, and found in sources dated at 
or near the time of the writing, and in the region 
where it was written and distributed. 
Turning to Pagels's second challenge, the 
canonization of the Book of Revelation, she states 
that it was left off of many lists of canonical books 
until the time of Constantine (161), which is not 
quite accurate. The book did not make it into the 
New Testament, as she would have us believe, by 
hook or by crook, but rather by the overwhelming 
consensus of the majority of councils, list mak-
ers, and influential writers, including those who 
knew the Apostle and accepted the Revelation 
as his work. The book was in the early canons 
from 170 to 400 AD including the Muratorian, 
Apostolic, Athanasian, and Augustinian canons, 
and was accepted by councils in 325, 393, 397, 
and 419 AD. The first council to reject it was the 
sixteenth council, the Laodicean Council, in the 
middle-fourth century. Laodicea was spoken of 
very negatively in the Revelation, as neither cold 
nor hot (Rev. 3:15), which may account for its 
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exclusion by them. It was restored by the very 
next council. 
If one can step outside the polemic, Pagels's 
Revelations produces some real gems, such as 
the analysis of the battle in heaven described in 
Revelation as a recurring motif originating in 
Babylon (26). There are several such diamonds 
in the rough, with tasty bits from the Gnostic 
Gospels themselves, making this book worth 
reading. Finally, the book ends on a sweet note 
worthy of concluding with: "Whether one sees in 
John's visions the destruction of the whole world 
or the dark tunnel that propels each of us toward 
our own death, his final vision suggests that even 
after the worst we can imagine has happened, we 
may find the astonishing gift of new life. Whether 
one shares that conviction, few readers miss see-
ing how these visions offer consolation and that 
most necessary of divine gifts-hope" (175). ;-
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